Study On Rural Collective Non-agriculture Construction Land Market Evolution Mechanism

Effective allocation of non-agricultural construction land is the necessary condition to economy growth and national income increasing. According to the different ownership character, non-agricultural construction land in China can be divided in two kinds:urban land belonged to nation and rural land belonged to collective. Rural collective non-agricultural construction land allocation be excluded out of market mechanism by law, influence the resource allocation efficiency strictly. Despite there were profound analytical research in existence to rural collective non-agricultural construction land institution, and had discussed the way which to perfect rural collective non-agricultural construction land transit institution from property, institutional change and transit model, and so on. But, research in existence couldn't study on the rural collective non-agricultural construction land resource allocation from the angle of subject behavior which economics mostly pay attention to. So there is specially meaning discuss the rural collective non-agricultural construction land market efficiency and evolvement problem from market mechanism perspective.This study stresses on discussing rural collective non-agricultural construction land market efficiency and evolvement problem from market participants' behavioral interaction perspective. On the basis of generalizing and analyzing the rural collective non-agricultural construction land market evolution process and its actuality, analyzes the logic of market evolvement, finding out the objective law behind of diversiform evolvement, analysing the long-term dynamic equilibrium, at last, verifies the theory analyze by discussing representative cases, discusses the institutional source of the rural collective non-agricultural construction land market failure by the trade cost model, and then find the policy rectification path.This research item consists of nine parts as follows:Chapter 1:Exordium. In the first part of this paper, the author introduces why makes this study from the market evolution perspective. Discuss the rural collective non-agricultural construction land market efficiency and evolvement problem. Market mechanism and rural collective non-agricultural construction land market in China do the brief introduce and review about relate theory study in existence. Following, the author shows us the researching purpose, researching contents and technique route.Chapter 2:Trade cost, institutional evolvement, and market mechanism:theoretical foundation. On the basis of explaining famous theories on trade cost, the author designs an analyzing framework through seeking the relationship among trade cost, institutional evolvement and market mechanism. The behavioral interaction of market principal parts in complete competitive market result in market clear-up by price complete mechanism and so on, lead to Pareto Efficiency. But there are expenses in price mechanism circulation. When the institutional environment changing, behavioral interaction of market principal parts makes the market evolve. Improving on market efficiency, becoming the commonly market mechanism under trade cost condition. Study on market evolvement mechanism should outspread as next analyzing route:market actuality analyzing—evolvement logic—evolvement law—long term equilibrium—policy remedy route.Chapter 3:Actuality analyzing of rural non-agriculture construction land market in China. In the following study, the author looks back the rural non-agriculture construction land management under planned economy in China firstly, analyzes the evolvement process of rural non-agriculture construction land management, then discusses characteristic meaning and insufficiency of the rural non-agriculture construction land market at present in China. The character of gradually reformation decides the land collocate institution cann't be divorced from set pattern of planned economy, the continuity of holding prerogative by government decide the government monopolization in the rural non-agriculture construction land market, monopolization make noneffective allocation. The special process of gradually reformation gives the chance entering market to rural non-agriculture construction land. Rural collective non-agricultural construction land entering market directly boosts optimize allocation. But there are lots of problem, for example:lack specific law foundation, correlation institution suitable reformation dropping behind, lack guarantee of rights and interests, illegibility income distribution, and so on.Chapter 4:Rural collective non-agricultural construction land entering market directly: market failure and policy rectification. The purpose of the paper is to study the causes of rural collective non-agricultural construction land market failure, seek the institutional source of rural collective non-agricultural construction land entering market in China getting into trouble, and then table the proposals of rectifying route of rural collective non-agricultural construction land entering market directly policy. Methods employed include partial equilibrium analysis and transaction cost analysis. The results indicate that the government monopoly the first non-agricultural construction land market and the incomplete property right, promote market transact cost. weaken affiliated person's supply and demand,effect transaction efficiency, furthermore, decrease social welfare. It is concluded that if want to achieve optimal allocation of land resources, respecting farmers' property rights should be the guiding ideology, on base of clearing rural collective non-agricultural construction land property rights, endowing the rights of entering market to rural collective, overcome the bottlenecks of rural collective non-agricultural construction land entering market directly from eliminating institutional barriers and clearing property rights etc angles.Chapter 5:Since the year non-agricultural construction land market appeared in 1980's, The monopolization of the government in the first market is the dominated character of non-agricultural construction land market at all times in China. Evidently, the monopolization conceive of the government couldn't maintain along with the development of the market economics. Large numbers of rural collective non-agricultural construction land coming into the market and continuous ordination of parochial management regulation one after the other in China indicate the rapid evolvement of rural collective non-agricultural construction land market. Study on the logic of rural collective non-agricultural construction land market evolvement, it is good for comprehending and consummating the non-agricultural construction land institutional reformation. The rural collective non-agricultural construction land market evolvement in China is the result of correlative interest group adjusting and reallocating benefit, is the transigent and eclectic result of among their benefit conflict. Interaction and benefit division between rural collective non-agricultural construction land direct interest group—Local government and farmer, take the crucial infect on the choice of rural collective non-agricultural construction land property reformation route. solve two problem—the financial revenue sustainable growth and raise farmers'income is two parallel main routes which not interfere with each other.Chapter 6:Study on evolution law of the rural collective non-agricultural construction land market in China. By analyzing evolution process of rural collective non-agricultural construction land market, this paper establish the analytical framework of the evolution of rural collective non-agricultural construction land market from the point of system transition. Based on the framework, we discuss the qualifications of rural collective non-agricultural construction land coming into the market through a comparative static analysis. Moreover, we elicit the Pareto optimal transferring interval. Then, by the comparative static analysis, we examine the effect of any changes of the relevant factors on rural collective non-agricultural construction land coming into the market. Finally, we give the explanations of some actual phenomena. At last, we put forward the evolution law of rural collective non-agricultural construction land market in China, make the direction of rural collective non-agricultural construction land market evolution clear, and point out the policy meaning of the evolution law of rural collective non-agricultural construction land market in China:There is different evolution level of rural collective non-agricultural construction land of different character in different district, respecting the law and treating to make a distinction is the best way which we can choose.Chapter 7:Study on the long-term dynamic equilibrium of the rural collective non-agricultural construction land market in China. In this paper, we do the economics analysis of the rural collective non-agricultural construction land market in China by game analysis way. Lay stress on Long-term Dynamic equilibrium of the rural collective non-agricultural construction land market in China. On the basis of the Construction entry-arrest dynamic game analytical framework, discussing the repeated game equilibrium condition, and taking into account the institution environment in China, we discuss the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium chosen by farmer and local government. The main research conclusion:the evolution of rural collective non-agricultural construction land market in China accord with the common entry-arrest dynamic game model, but the affect from farmer to local government make the government lose steady initiative superiority, Now the complexion which farmer and government do the leader by turns had appeared, {beat, (entry, entry)}become the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the long-term dynamic game. For avoiding the loss of social welfare in the the process of the rural collective non-agricultural construction land market evolution and making the conversion from disequilibrium to the long-term Cournot-Nash equilibrium come true, we should break the monopolization of government in the first market, allow the rural collective non-agricultural construction be bargained in the market; accelerate the construction of rural collective economic organization, make the providing power balance of the non-agricultural construction land in the market come true as soon as possible.Chapter 8:The rural collective non-agricultural construction land market:cases analyze. In this paper, we chose two representative cases—Kunshan city in Jiangsu province and Xiamen city in Fujian province, analyse market function mechanism in case district at present. Under the same background of institution environment and market economy development, the market principal parts' different choice make Kunshan and Xiamen innovated different rural collective non-agricultural construction land institution, and then there different non-agricultural construction land market state. The long-term dynamic equilibrium of Kunshan rural collective non-agricultural construction land market accord with Cournot-Nash equilibrium. These all verify the foregoing theory analyze.Chapter 9:Research conclusion and policy meanings. Based on the foregoing research outcome, useful policy suggestions are put forwards improving rural collective non-agricultural construction land market in future. i.e. Respecting farmers' land property rights and interests; clearing the rural collective non-agricultural construction land property rights; allowing the rural collective non-agricultural construction land to enter market directly, respecting the objective law behind of diversiform evolvement, adjust measures to local conditions avoid guillotine cutting in all country; accelerating the construction of rural collective economic organization, make the providing power balance of the non-agricultural construction land in the market come true as soon as possible; harmonizing interaction behavior between local government and farmers to actualize land resource optimum allocation, avoiding to urban and rural collective non-agricultural construction land market Cournot-Nash equilibrium come forth.