| The pollution control of urban air pollution is an important content in the construction of ecological civilization in our country.In the past three decades,China's urban air pollution problems have undergone dramatic changes,manifested by the shift of pollution types(from initial coal-fired pollution to the current air haze).The problem of urban haze pollution is not a separate event,it has spatial heterogeneity and is gradually accumulated,Same with most public affairs,government is the main provider of public goods for air haze control as well as the leader in the fight against PM2.5 air pollution.In view of the frequently-happened PM2.5 air pollution,the central government mainly gives a direction from the overall situation.And since air pollution problems are more local,local governments should choose appropriate countermeasure based on different organizational environment,so as to meet the differentiated institutional needs.Therefore,the governance of local governments is important.Compared with water pollution and solid waste pollution,the air pollution of residence zone is most externally obvious.Local governments tend to take corresponding strategies for different types of pollutants.As a consequence,taking "Free ride" becomes a common phenomenon,that is,to relax environmental regulation and other strategic behavior.It has a significant impact on the PM2.5 air pollution control of local governments.So,as the core actors of environmental governance,why does the local governments choose strategic behavior in the?What is the incentive and restraint effect of the current institutional arrangement on the PM2.5 air pollution control of local governments?What is the mechanism of local governments'behavior in the organization's field?Focus on these problems,this paper makes a theoretical analysis and empirical study on the logic of local governments in their behavior of PM2.5 air pollution control.In particular,this paper analyzes how the local government,as a key actor in the governance field,alleviate the various pressures from the governance field by selecting appropriate behavior.In order to further optimize the local government's PM2.5 air pollution control behavior and promote the construction of ecological civilization,this paper analyzes the causes of the deviation of the local governments' behavior and the interrelationship between the motivations and ability as internal variables and incentives and constraints as external variables.Secondly,this paper analyzes the influence of local government competition on PM2.5 air pollution control under the system arrangement of China,and then analyzes the relationship between PM2.5 air pollution control and the local leaders'tenure period as well as their individual characteristics.The main contents are as follows:From the aspect of pollution trends and spatial heterogeneity,the paper first interprets the timing changes of urban air pollution,diachronically analyzes the corresponding national and government policies,and compares domestic and international air quality Metrics.Then,the paper analyzes the temporal and spatial evolution characteristics and rules of PM2.5 air pollution of 338 cities in China from 2001 to 2010,so as to form a holistic,general and comprehensive understanding of the PM2.5 air pollution in order to further analyze the air pollution control behavior of local governments.The results show that:(1)China's PM2.5 environmental air quality standards of pollutants projects and form is tending to be complete,the concentration of pollutants threshold is more stringent,and the revised basis and procedures of national standard are more scientific.But in general,the serious lag of China's governance policy is still an important reason for the inefficiency of environmental governance,and there are still some gaps compared with the standard made by developed countries and international environmental organizations.(2)China's PM2.5 air pollution was gradually spreading from the northeast region to the central and eastern regions.The peak value of PM2.5 appeared in 2007,with an average annual value of 31.36?g/m3,which was 1.13 times of the annual average of PM2.5 concentration in 2001.(3)China's PM2.5 air pollution has a clear lowland plain preference.The PM2,5 concentration in the northern and western regions is relatively small,and the severe PM2.5 air pollution is concentrated in the cities of North China,and the pollution gradually spread from the northeastern region to the central and eastern regions.The trend that serious pollution tends to happen in the central region is extremely obvious.The distribution of urban PM2.5 concentration also showed positive local spatial autocorrelation.Thinking deep about the local governments'air pollution control in changing environment,the paper first analyzes the influential factors of PM2.5 air pollution,puts forward that the local government is sometime "ineffective" and try to find the reason using the theory of "strategic behavior".And then based on the "organizational analysis of the new institutionalism" theory to further explain "how and why" the local government organizations and their staff choose to do or not to do,and to restore the resource dependencies and organizational action logic of local government and its internal members of the organization.The results show that:(1)Urbanization is not conducive to the improvement of urban air pollution control.Road infrastructure construction,excessive energy consumption is the main factor affecting urban air quality in China.The increase of urban residents'per capita income and public transport,keeping away from the provincial capital city and reasonable industrial structure has a stable inhibitory effect on urban air pollution.(2)The local governments have some deficiencies in air pollution control and governance mode.The application of science and technology has not yet become the key force of environmental management in China and can not play a positive role in the air pollution control.(3)Air environmental monitoring system and air environmental regulatory system is the action space of local governments.But the existing bar-based,territorial-based local environmental management system attach importance to local development and neglect the environmental protection,the implement of environmental responsibility and the intervene in environmental monitoring.On the other hand,the fundamental reason of ineffective air pollution control is the lack of management system,such as resource endowment,environmental protection standards and sudden environmental events,as well as the local governments'governance philosophy for economic development and the disregard of environmental protection.So are the weakening of environmental protection administration and lack of innovation capacity.Based on the theory of organizational system,a three-dimensional dynamic structure framework of behavior dimension,institutional dimension and subject dimension is established in the field of governance and local government governance,attempted to explain the governance field of urban PM2.5 air pollution in a more three-dimensional way.This paper analyzes the governance field of PM2.5 air pollution from different dimensions,forms the basic cognition to the participants and the institutional environment of the governance field,and then analyzes that the control field formed three different developmental characteristics because of the different system,habit and behavior of the participants.Then,it analyzes the actual situation of the people's livelihood in Jiangsu Province,and embeds the motivations and competency elements into the logic of the local government's haze control behavior,so as to explore the influence of the governance field and the local government's choice of PM2.5 air pollution control effect.The results show that:(1)The PM2.5 air pollution control field has the characteristics of emerging field,fuzzy field and strong field,and the local government is subject to the pressure from the central(upper)government,the influential external organization,as well as other participants in the field of cognitive pressure.Therefor,the local government eases various pressures from the governance field through putting forward environmental regulation,gaining resources and communication coordination and so on.(2)It is a rational choice for the local government to relax the environmental regulation under the current institutional environment.The top-down GDP-oriented performanceevaluation mechanism has led to the local governments to enforce environmental regulations.At the same time,the local government's ability to manage haze will be affected.In the view of institutional environment and local governments'air pollution control behavior,the paper explains the causes of different local governments' behavior due to the difference of the objective function,the external difference of the behavioral activity and the discretion.Then,the author analyzes the logic of the local governments'air pollution control behavior,divides the fiscal decentralization and the political centralization system into the same analytical logic framework,and analyzes the influence of the local government autonomy and the cadre system of the party members on the haze control effect of local government,and to examine the influence of incentive and restraint systems.Finally,using the relevant socioeconomic data and the individual characteristics of government officials to build a metrological economic model,respectively,to examine the effect of financial constraints and local government leadership promotion incentives on PM2.5 pollution.The results show that:(1)In order to decompose the pressure on the local fiscal revenue and expenditure,the local government began to pursue extra-budgetary income.In this way,the use of special fund of environmental protection and other public welfare aspects leads to that the air pollution can not be timely and effective solved and then become more serious.(2)Under the encouragement of local government promotion in China,the PM2.5 annual average concentration of the city was increased by 0.4?g/m3 or higher,when one year before the party secretary facing the position shift,compared with other years during the term of office.The closer the replacement,the more powerful the leaders improve the economic performance during the period,and in this case the city PM2.5 concentration is often increased,and ultimately formed a pollution cycle effect.At the same time,the local party secretary of the term and the city haze PM2.5 pollution concentration show an inverted U-shaped curve. |
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