Labeling policies and international trade of genetically modified food (Canada, France, Japan)

Many countries have adopted alternative labeling policies for genetically modified (GM) food. In this dissertation, I develop an economic model of the market effects of genetically modified food labeling policies. My main objective is to explain and to evaluate alternative GM food labeling policies of GM food, from an economic perspective.; In the first section of the dissertation, I conduct an empirical case study of the effects of voluntary labeling of non-GM food in Canada and mandatory labeling of GM food in France. I use this motivating example to build an analytical model of labeling regulations, focusing on food processors' and retailers' incentives to label or not. With this model, I show that voluntary and mandatory labeling results in different consumer choice outcomes and welfare effects. I show that the effects of these labeling policies depend on the per unit profit of GM versus non-GM food, on the market share of consumers willing to buy GM food, and on the type of food product (fresh versus processed).; In the second section, I try to explain international differences in GM food labeling policies. Using econometric regression analysis, I show that international trade factors and domestic production factors help explain labeling policy choices across countries. In particular, large GM crop producing countries avoid using mandatory labeling. Countries in Europe or those exporting GM soybeans, corn, or canola mainly to the European Union or corn to Japan are more likely to have mandatory or stringent labeling policies. Countries with no labeling regulations are likely to be less developed countries, who have ratified the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.; In the third section, I study the economic effects of the international harmonization of labeling policies. Using a partial equilibrium model in an open economy, I simulate the case of GM wheat commercialization under different labeling scenarios. I find that all countries should prefer a harmonized labeling scheme to the current international heterogeneity of labeling regulations. However, harmonization of a voluntary labeling scheme would increase welfare in developing countries, whereas mandatory labeling harmonization may only benefit consumers and producers in countries opposed to GM crops.