| Many studies take the end of the Cold War as a watershed in US-China relations, noting the current mingling of domestic and foreign policy, and the heightened activity of interest groups. This analysis shows that continuity has been as noticeable as change in US-China policy, that the national interest was never been clear or undisputed, and that the line between governmental and non-governmental actors has often been blurred. It also shows that interests, whether national or domestic, were not exogenous or given but constructed: although the international environment provided certain challenges and opportunities, and material resources imposed certain constraints, ideas played a crucial role in determining the way interests were perceived and power was employed.; The research uses the concept of recognition to examine the way in which a national interest toward China was constructed at five crucial moments over the last hundred years: the Open Door notes of 1899–1900; the debate over the recognition of the Republic of China between 1911 and 1913; non-recognition of the PRC in the late 1940s; normalization of relations with China in the 1970s; and Permanent Normal Trade Relations and China's Accession to the WTO in 2000. In each case, events in China or the broader context of US-China policy created mounting pressure on the existing policy framework, resulting in a fundamental re-examination of US policy. Resolution of the crisis involved not only a rational reassessment of policy in the light of new circumstances, but also a fundamental re-evaluation of the US role in China. Participants within and outside government offered competing interpretations of the same body of facts and their implications. Perceptions of national and particular interests were shaped by enduring myths about China, competing conceptions of US national identity, and historically specific debates over expansionism, self-determination, containment, détente, and globalization. They also reflected differing ideas about US relations with other countries, including Japan and the Soviet Union. As a result of the new recognition one vision of US interests in China emerged victorious and would be institutionalized as policy, shaping the terms of future debate, and privileging certain actors and marginalizing others. |
