THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HEGEL'S AND MARX'S DOCTRINES OF LOGIC (DIALECTIC, ALTHUSSER, ENGELS)

The explanation of the specific constitution of Marx's deductive method presupposes the delineation of the specific difference between his and Hegel's doctrines of logic. The available interpretations falsely suppose Marx's method is merely one or another variation on Kant's transcendentalism and not an elaboration on Hegel's dialecticism. These interpretations falsely assume an absolute difference between Hegel's and Marx's doctrines. The fact is, the difference between Hegel's and Marx's methods is a relative difference between the two possible modes of application of the same dialectic determinations or forms of motion. Hegel's lapse into a reiterative or impositive formalism in the mode of his application of the determinations he deduces ultimately transmutes his penultimate dialecticism into a systematic formalism. Marx's criticism of Hegel's ultimate lapse means the recognitive or self-reflective mode of his own application is the culmination and not the interruptive transmutation of methodic dialecticism.;Chapter two canvasses Marx's explanation of the difference between Hegel's method and his own. Marx claims Hegel illogically presupposes the absolute rationality of the available empiric and civic matters of fact. Hegel's mode of application fallaciously turns an historic and contradictive progression into a mystic and non-contradictive emanation of the absolute logic. Marx's distinctive mode of application is precisely the fact he never merely presupposes the available facts constitute the culmination of rationality.;Chapter three discusses the exhibition of Marx's deductive application of the dialectic determinations in his elaboration of the science of economics.;Chapter four critically evaluates Engels's fallacious assertion dialecticism is an historicism. The philosophic basis of his historicism is his conflation of intimative representations and deductive concepts. He transmutes Marx's recognitive or self-reflective application of the dialectic method into a reflective empiricism and a denominative systematism.;Chapter one elaborates Hegel's deduction of the basic determinations in the form of a criticism of Parmenides's inception of dialecticism and almost immediate lapse into formalism. A recapitulation of Hegel's deduction of the first five determinations in his science of logic focuses on the fact these determinations constitute forms of motion.;Chapter five is a criticism of Althusser's transmutation of Marx's method into an architectonic transcendentalism.