Manufacturer's Cooperation Strategy On Corporate Social Responsibility Investment From The Perspective Of A Supply Chain

Nowadays,governments non-governmental organizations(NGOs)and consumers are encouraging manufacturers to carry out Corporate Social Responsibility(CSR)in international cooperation.However,on the one hand,during seeking down-stream partners and developing markets,most Chinese manufacturers are unable to effectively carry out CSR in the supply chain due to lack of international cooperation experience,as well as risk prevention and control ability.On the other hand,as for up-stream cooperation,the experience of many well-known manufacturers shows that some suppliers often fail to fulfill CSR,that directly damages the manufacturers and the supply chain.This thesis focuses on the problems above that encountered by manufacturers in the process of promoting the CSR investment cooperation among up-stream and down-stream partners.The main research work is summarized as below:First,this thesis proposes the CSR investment cooperation strategy considering the competition.This strategy helps manufacturer collaborate with down-stream retailers on CSR investment.If the manufacturer and the retailers adopt "no cooperation" or "only-CSR-investment collaboration",the manufacturer cooperates with two retailers in one region at the same time to introduce internal competition,which will increase the market share and total profits of the supply chain.If manufacturer and retailers cooperate in "CSR investment+pricing",the manufacturer cooperates with only one retailer in one region to avoid internal competition,which will improve the effective CSR investment level,and increase market share,plus total profits of the supply chain.Contrast the manufacturer-led supply chain(large manufacturer)and the retailer-led supply chain(small manufacturer),the co-opetition strategy of introducing internal competition joint with " only-CSR-investment cooperation" taken by the manufacturer will result in the total profits of the retailer-led supply chain significantly more than those of the manufacturer-led supply chain.Secondly,this thesis explores whether one CSR investment-level-difference-concerned manufacturer could prompt the supplier to invest in CSR.It reflects the manufacturers'supervision on the up-stream supplier's CSR investment and the manufacturer's attention to their input factors.The manufacturer is concerned with both profit and CSR investment level.This thesis analyzes two types of manufacturer,the one with ahead-seeking behavior and the one with ahead-averse behavior.The supplier-led supply chain(small manufacturer)and the manufacturer-led supply chain(large manufacturer)are considered.The results show that the ahead-seeking manufacturer will improve the total CSR investment level of the supply chain.In the supplier-led supply chain,the manufacturer motivates the supplier to increase CSR investment;While in the manufacturer-led supply chain,the manufacturer cannot motivate the supplier to increase CSR investment.Thus,the supplier-led supply chain achieves a higher level of CSR investment than in the manufacturer-led supply chain.The ahead-averse manufacturer will hinder CSR investment cooperation between the manufacturer and the supplier.Furthermore,this thesis studies how one fairness-concerned manufacturer impacts the CSR investment cooperation in the supply chain.It reflects manufacturer's supervision on the up-stream supplier's CSR investment,as well as manufacturer's focus on output issues.It analyzes the manufacturer who pays attention to the fairness of profit distribution between its profits and the supplier at the same time.This thesis considers that the manufacturer and supplier decide the wholesale price through Nash Bargaining Game.The manufacturer with weak bargaining power or low return on CSR investment is defined as a small manufacturer.It shows that if the manufacturer experiences advantageous inequality or disadvantages inequality will hinder the supply chain from investing in CSR.If the manufacturer does not experience advantageous inequality or disadvantages inequality,the manufacturer with insignificant(or significant)fairness ideal will motivate the supplier(or manufacturer)to invest in CSR.Aiming at the problem of promoting CSR investment cooperation in the supply chain,under the influence of the fairness-concerned behavior,this thesis gives the advantages of the small manufacturer,compared with the large manufacturer.Last but not least,this thesis suggests the government,NGOs,and manufacturers should take the measures actively,such as CSR rankings,awards,and training courses,to encourage the manufacturer to develop CSR investment cooperation in supply chains and to induce the manufacturer's comparison behavior.The manufacturers,especially the small manufacturers,not only should collaborate with the down-stream retailers in terms of CSR investment decisions,but also can cooperate with two competing retailers simultaneously.Besides,focusing on the difference in CSR investment levels between members and performing better than the supplier are more effective for small manufacturers to develop CSR investment cooperation in supply chains.