Signal Game Study On Appropriation And Fund Raising Under The Government Led And Social Participation Disaster Relief Mode

The management of disaster relief funds is very important to the development of disaster management activities.Under the disaster management mode of "government led social participation" in China,it is the reform direction of disaster management mechanism to give full play to the institutional advantages and lead social forces to actively participate.However,there are different degrees of information asymmetry in current disaster relief work,which not only breeds the problem of abusing disaster relief funds,but also leads to the problem of distribution of rights of donated materials.This not only affects the government’s leading advantages,but also dampens the enthusiasm of social forces to donate,and brings great resistance to the reform of Chinese disaster prevention,mitigation and relief system.In order to better solve various risks caused by information asymmetry,this paper focuses on disaster relief funds from both government and society,and constructs a game theory analysis framework for disaster relief fund allocation and collection management under the background of information asymmetry,taking the "raising to using" of disaster relief funds as the main line of research.The management process of disaster relief funds mainly involves two sources:government appropriation and social donation,and the disaster relief funds from each source involve two main stages:fund raising and fund use.In general,the government departments are faced with four practical problems,namely,in the issue of government funding,how to prevent malfeasant officials from falsely reporting the disaster and obtaining relief materials,and how to achieve accurate supervision over the interception and misappropriation of relief funds by malfeasant officials;In the process of social fundraising,how to issue fundraising strategies to convey the real disaster situation,and how to allocate the operation authority of fundraising relief materials.However,the current quantitative research on government disaster relief fund management mainly focuses on financial system planning,performance evaluation and other issues.The research on verification and supervision is mostly qualitative,lacking quantitative research.In the research on the management of social disaster relief funds,more attention is paid to the situation where social forces are the main management body,and less attention is paid to the management mode of government overall planning.To sum up,this paper has done the following innovative work around the above four core issues:First,in the issue of government funding for disaster relief,government staff are subject to double restrictions on time and office resources,and it is difficult to carefully check the reported disaster,which provides an opportunity for derelict officials of grassroots governments to falsely report the disaster.In this paper,considering that the superior government has private information on its own verification capability and verification strategy,the published disaster verification strategy is taken as the signal,and the goal is to reduce the false reporting of disasters by grass-roots malfeasant officials for profit.A signal game model between local reporting and superior supervision is established,and the superior government’s optimal disaster verification strategy is analyzed,Furthermore,the advantages of the combination of "strong before weak" and "weak before strong" strategies in multi-period disaster verification are analyzed.Second,in the use of government disaster relief funds,because front-line grassroots officials have private information about whether they are self interested,and the information disclosure on the use of disaster relief materials is highly operational.In this paper,considering that the supervision department takes the information disclosure of disaster relief work by grassroots officials as a signal,with the goal of achieving accurate verification of self interested grassroots officials,a signal game model of disaster relief supervision is eshtablished.The reasons for the current regulatory confusion in individual regions are analyzed,and the conditions for the superior government to achieve information screening are further analyzed by introducing an information disclosure incentive mechanism.The study found that after the introduction of information disclosure incentive mechanism,the superior government can realize information screening,but the incentive strength is not the greater the better.Third,in the issue of raising social relief funds,the government departments need a certain time to assess and review the disaster situation,which leads to the fact that social forces cannot know the actual losses of the disaster at the initial stage,thus providing an opportunity for individual grass-roots officials to seize the opportunity to raise money.In this paper,a signal game model of fund-raising information disclosure strategy is established with the goal of information transmission through fund-raising information disclosure by disaster relief departments.The strategy of issuing fundraising information is studied,and the conditions for the establishment of the separating equilibrium and the exclusion of the pooling equilibrium are also analyzed.It is found that under complete information,the government’s optimal fund-raising strategy will be affected by its total demand for fund-raising materials.under imcomplete information,the government of the heavily affected area should adopt the principle of cautious fundraising,which is reducing the amount of fundraising materials and improving the quality specifications.Forth,in terms of the use of social disaster relief funds,social forces cannot know the operating efficiency of the current government disaster relief departments on donated materials.On the other hand,earmarked donation can not only stimulate the willingness of social forces to donate,but also reduce the operational efficiency of disaster relief departments.In order to fully stimulate the willingness of social forces to donate and maximize the disaster relief effect of the donated materials,an incomplete information game model is established for the allocation of the operation authority of the donated materials for disaster relief.The two solutions under incomplete information,namely,information disclosure by government departments and negotiation with social forces,were put forward respectively,and the optimal decision under each model and the applicable conditions of different strategies were analyzed.The study found that under the mode of independent decision-making by the government,when the difference between the two types of materials is small,the disaster relief effect of fully accepting targeted donations is the best.Whether government departments should take information disclosure depends on the cost of information disclosure.While whether the government departments need to decide the proportion of earmarked donations through negotiation depends on the time preference of both parties.From the perspective of research innovation and research value,first,in combination with the particularity of disaster management led by the government and participated by the society in China,this paper studies the management of disaster relief funds in the supply and use stages through government appropriation and social donation,which further expands the research field of disaster management and enriches the research content of disaster management.Second,the government led disaster situation verification model,disaster relief supervision model,disaster relief fund-raising strategy release model,and disaster relief material authority allocation model are established.While not only providing solutions to existing management difficulties,but also providing a basic theoretical model with a high degree of scene matching for subsequent research.The third is to fully consider the information asymmetry between the superior supervision department and the lower level officials,the government disaster relief department and the social forces,and combine the incomplete information game theory and signal game theory to provide theoretical reference and management enlightenment for the government disaster management department’s strategy selection.