Beyond A Gesture:The Interaction Of Trade Policies Between China And The U.S. (1969-1976)

This dissertation examines the interaction between the U.S.and Chinese governments on trade issues during the period 1969-1976,and attempts to explore the interplay between trade and the Cold War strategies of the two countries,as well as internal political issues.The full paper is divided into four parts.The first part focuses on how the U.S.and the Chinese Communist Party embedded their traditional China/U.S.policies in the Cold War landscape of 1949,thus allowing a new trade relationship to take shape.At this particular point in 1949,the U.S.and China first categorically rejected U.S.-China trade in a sudden and unexpected change of circumstances,but then reconstructed their economic ties in the context of the Cold War strategy.It covers the US government’s abandonment of the "open door" policy,the NSC-41 document establishing the two-sided principle of "pulling and fighting",and the embarrassing situation of "only pulling but not fighting" in practice."The Chinese Communist Party also made several policy turns from welcoming U.S.businessmen to expelling Walden,and finally returning to maintaining trade and economic ties with the United States.Although the willingness of both sides to maintain trade contacts was eventually crushed by the Korean War,both sides apparently recognized the limited "trade contacts" under strong government control,and this set the stage for U.S.-China trade interactions in the 1970 s.The second part focuses on the interaction between the U.S.and China on trade issues,driven by Nixon’s "economic engagement" policy from 1969 to 1972.It is true that Sino-US diplomatic relations warmed up rapidly because of the Sino-Soviet confrontation,but trade matters as a"door knocker" did not progress,and internal conflicts between the two sides were the main reason for the slow progress of Sino-US trade."The National Security Council(NSC)and the State Department(SSC)were in fierce conflict over trade policy with China.The Kissinger-led NSC insisted that U.S.-China trade should remain symbolic,while the Rogers-led State Department insisted that trade potential with China be realized as soon as possible to move trade to the next level.In the end,both sides chose the strategy of restraining their trade needs while waiting for the other side to make unsolicited pleas in order to use economic ties as a diplomatic advantage.But after several attempts,both sides could only define bilateral trade as "symbolic"and as some kind of complement to diplomatic relations,not as a serious diplomatic issue.The third part focuses on the various manifestations of the breakthrough of "symbolic trade"between China and the United States in 1973-1974,and the responses of both countries.In the limited trade exchange between China and the United States,the demand for food,which had both warlike and livelihood-improving properties,suddenly increased in 1973,pushing the trade between China and the United States to a level that both governments had not expected.This phenomenon caused a violent backlash within the two countries,as the struggle between the State Department and the National Security Council over the "U.S.-China Trade National Committee" continued on the U.S.side,and Shanghai on the Chinese side began to use U.S.wheat imports as an excuse to challenge the central government’s long-standing policy of ignoring local interests."The Chinese side,Shanghai,also began to use U.S.wheat imports to defend itself against the central government’s long-standing policy of ignoring local interests.But in the end both sides decided to acquiesce to this breakthrough.Part IV focuses on the story of the failed integration of trade policies between China and the United States in 1975-1976,which eventually came to a standstill.China’s frenzied purchase of U.S.grain quickly created a severe shortage of foreign exchange,and the conflict between the "bar" and the "block"-the central government and Shanghai-severely limited China’s ability to predict and As a result,China had to stop the breakthrough in U.S.-China trade and instead seek a larger strategic fit with the United States,asking it to provide security for China’s modernization on a more macro level.The U.S.government,however,believed that Mao and Zhou were approaching the end of their lives and that the policies of their successors were still unknown,so it refused to go along with the Chinese proposal and instead reverted to trying to bring bilateral trade back to a "symbolic" level.1976 was a time of civil strife for both sides and no time for economic issues.Although the U.S.and China did not reach a consensus on U.S.-China trade during this period,it provided a reference and theoretical basis for deeper U.S.involvement in China’s modernization thereafter.