Private Enterprise Labor Relations Under The New Situation And Coordination Mechanism

In the process of China's socialist market economic restructuring, the private economy, the state-owned economy and the foreign economy are becoming three main powers to promote national economic growth. However, referring to labor relation of enterprise, there are obviously more labor problems in private enterprises than in the latter. In Particular, when the financial crisis is spreading to the real economy, the new "Labor Contract Law" has been carried out and a large number of multinational companies enter China due to further liberalization of our country's capital market, private enterprises meet an unprecedented competitive pressure which makes problems of labor relation spring up abruptly. Jiangsu is one of provinces with most developed private economy and its private enterprises make an important contribution in stimulating social employment, increasing the income of workers, creating tax revenue, pushing independent innovation and promoting social harmony and stability and so on. Labor relation of private enterprises in Jiangsu Province is generally stable and harmonious, but there are also some problems which make labor conflicts intensified and make labor relation intense appearing in some places or some periods. If not be adjusted in time, these problems will not only endanger the sustainable development of enterprises, but also have a negative impact on social harmony and stability. In this view, the dissertation takes Jiangsu Province as an example and chooses labor relation of private enterprise in the new situation as the study object. Following the analysis paradigm of "target known - mechanism unknown", it starts from analyzing present labor relation problems in private enterprises, then uses game theory approach and related theory to analyze the reason of labor conflicts in order to design a whole mechanism of mediating labor-management relation in private enterprises which is at the core of protecting and realizing labor force's property right.On the basis of sorting out East-West documentation about labor relation, this dissertation elaborates on the related concepts and theoretical foundation– Marks'labor relation theory and property right theory of the school of New Institutional Economics in detail. Then according to the data from Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook and information from field researches, it analyzes private enterprise's development status in Jiangsu and its labor relation in the new situation. It also reveals the main problems of private enterprise's labor relation which are that labor disputes become more frequent; labor conflicts gradually change to highlighted and collective and labor conflicts mainly display the employer's violation to the employee's legitimate rights and interests. Furthermore, it builds up a Dynamic Game Model of Incomplete Information to research the influence on strategy-making of the two main sides of the game and on the enterprise labor relations when different variables make a change. Then combined with the theory of property right, it concludes that unclear definition of property right, incomplete employment contract, imperfect relevant system and lagged construction of trade union are the specific reasons for the industrial conflicts. Based on above conclusions, surrounding government and enterprise it puts forward some specific measures to building a mediating mechanism of labor relations in private enterprises which is aimed at protecting and realizing labor force's property right. For example, strengthening labor legislation and related mechanisms; establishing appropriate enterprise's internal management mechanism; improving the social security system; improving the labor market and promoting the construction of trade unions and collective bargaining.The innovation of this dissertation is the use of game theory analysis method. In this method, the factors which influence behavioral strategies of two game partners are expressed in the form of variables. And then it tries to reveal the causes of industrial conflicts by analyzing the process where each variable plays a role in decision-making of game partners.