The Research On Supervision Of Safety Production In China's Coal Mine

The energy demand in china is extremely urgent along with the rapid growth of the China's economy. China is also one of the biggest coal producing countries that whose coal reserves is very rich in the world. Coal meets the most of our energy needs and plays an important position in our energy structure. Coal production takes up a great part in China's primary energy composition and China's energy consumption. Coal acts as the engine to the national economic development and provides a powerful energy security to our economic. However, the safety in coal mines production facing a serious situation. The coal mine disaster often happens along with mass casualties. Million tons of coal mine death is still in the higher level. There are many major and big accidents happen every year that not only caused great casualties, and influence to the government's image. Coal mining accident not only occur in the middle and small coal mine whose production conditions are not well, but also in the State-owned coal enterprise which have advanced technology.Although the economic interests and lower technology can cause the coal mine accident, we should attract more attention on the supervision in the coal mine. The research on this topic not only can construct the suited theory of china's coal mine supervision and enrich the research in the social regulation, but also can improve the performance of coal mine safety supervision in China and protect the legitimate rights and interests of the coal mine workers. In addition, more researches on this topic have certain significance of the supervision system construction in other industry.Around the issue of supervision of safety production in china's coal mine, we build a game model in both the regulators and the mines owners. Taking full account of the characteristics of China's regulatory regime, regulatory policy and other conditions, we come to factors that affect the behavior of coal mining enterprises from the view of regulations. We bring forward policy proposals to improve regulation in the base of the game model and external experience. The thesis is divided into parts as follows:The first part, it introduces the research background and research significance of safety supervision of China's coal mine, etc. At the same time it summarizes the literature of this study at home and abroad, further making sure of the content and innovations on the basis of this.The second part, it defines related concepts of safety production and safety production supervision firstly, and then generalizes the current situation of safety production of China's coal mine, saying the necessity of strengthening supervision. Again, it sums up achievements of safety supervision and proposes challenges of safety supervision of China's coal mine in the new situation.The third part, based on the analysis above, this thesis constructs a game model of coal mine supervision between the coal mining enterprises and regulators, analyzes the influential factors of how the coal mining enterprises and regulators act. It includes four aspects, such as the safety input, accident treatment cost, the punishment of the regulators on malpractice and the regulate cost. We also discuss the possible regulatory failure.The fourth part, this thesis compares the safety supervision of the coal mine in the United States, Germany and South Africa, and then concludes some experience and enlightenment that can improve the safety supervision in China from four part, such as strengthening the legal binding force, straightening out the supervision system, paying attention to education training and the science and technology, implementing the enterprise.The fifth part, combining with the conclusions of the game model of coal mine supervision and the experience of other countries based on the above, this thesis puts forward to some specific measures about how to improve supervision of china's coal mine safety production from six parts, such as increasing safety input, strengthening enterprise external constraint mechanism and improving the regulation efficiency, introducing incentive compatibility mechanism, perfecting supervision system and improving the quality of the miners.Previous studies are often based on a single view of government or business perspective. They have not fully taking the game and interact in both sides into account. We build a game model in both the regulators and the mines owners and take full account of the characteristics of China's regulatory regime and the game process. Our resulting policy proposals are more specific and feasible. This article also analysis and discuss the failure of the China's coal mine safety supervision deeply and hope to bring some enlightenment in China coal mine safety supervision.