The Self-interest Of The Local Government Policy Implementation

As one of the important links of public policy, policy implementation plays avital role in public policy study, which is an important step to the realization of policyobjectives. With in-depth study of policy implementation, policy implementationdeviation attracts more and more people’s attention. This thesis analyzes thephenomenon of deviation of the local government in the implementation process ofpublic policy taking the form of case studies with the local government self-interest astheoretical basis.The central government’s macro-policy-making also relies largely on localgovernments’ effective implementation, while there is often policy deviation in theactual policy implementation process. Of course, policy implementation deviationmay lies in the fact that policies made by the central government may not meet thelocal facts, or the policies are deviated when communicated to local governments aswell as some other possible factors. However, self-serving behavior of localgovernments in the implementation process of public policy is an extremely importantfactor. In order to treat local government’s behavior of self-interest with the right way,we firstly need to objectively know the self-interest of local governments andacknowledge its reasonable existence; At the same time we should have a clearunderstanding about the policy implementation deviation so as to prevent localgovernments from acting unreasonably for their self-interest from the respects ofsystem, environment and other aspects, and ensure effective execution of publicpolicy.This paper attempts to discuss the deviation of policy implementation caused bylocal governments’ self-interest behaviors in the form of case analyses, and then putsforward the strategy to avoid and prevent local governments’ unreasonableself-interest so as to avoid public policy executive deviation, ensure the commonalityof public policy, and ensure the effective implementation of the policy. The firstchapter mainly discusses the significance of this study through the discussion of thecurrent study in this field both at home and abroad. The second chapter mainlyincludes: defining core concepts including policy implementation and governmentself-interest; introducing the theoretical basis of local government self-interest("Economic man" hypothesis theory and Principal-agent theory); study design andimplementation. The third chapter introduces the positioning and implementation ofthe policy objectives of the featured vernacular dwelling construction, including the construction background, content and targeting; effects of the implementation of thepolicy about the featured vernacular dwelling construction in Xuan’en County.Through comparing the differences in policy objectives between central governmentand local government in terms of methane construction, the thesis reflects theperformance of local government in the implementation of the policy. The fourthchapter introduces self-interest behaviors of Xuan’en local government inimplementing the policy of the featured vernacular dwelling construction. Chapterfive introduces the reasons of self-interest behaviors and the impacts to localgovernments. Chapter six discusses how to treat the self-serving behavior of localgovernment and puts forward some control measures.Through theoretical analysis and case studies, this thesis may draw the followingconclusions:(1) Local government’s self-interest has a certain degree of rationality,which should be acknowledged and supported because such reasonable self-interestplays an important role in promoting the development of local economy and society.Therefore, self-interest of local governments should be properly defined.(2) Based onthe proper defining of self-interest of local governments, reasonable division of theresponsibilities and rights between central government and local authority, whichgives local governments the initiative power for development, is an importantmeasure to avoid self-interest behaviors of local governments.(3) The systemconstruction and quality improvement should be viewed as equally important. Anyexternal causes are inevitably driven by internal factors, similarly, in order tosupervise the self-interest behaviors of local governments most efficiently, we need tocombine the external supervision and self-discipline.