Research On Evolutionary Game Of Local Government Strategy Of Rural Land Conversion In Industrial Park

Industrial park land use problem such as land idle, regulation tension andunlawful construction and other issues are on account of local government behaviordeviation in the implementation of rural land conversion policy. For fiscal revenue,the investment performance of local government interests, selective strategicallyimplementing land use control policy of local government in the industrial park. Localgovernment applies to policy of rural land conversion in order to maximize benefit foritself. Local government has both active and conservative strategy. Its active strategymeans that it firstly turn rural collective land into state-owned land by expropriation,sell to enterprise for land revenue, investment promotion and capital introduction,namely expropriation-reservation-transfer mode. Conservative strategy refers to thelocal governments give up the mode, allow the free trade between enterprises andpeasantry; punish unlawful activity in violation of land regulation policy with a finefor the main purpose of legitimizing land transfer procedures. As the subjects of thelimited rationality, local government decides strategy by gradually exploring studyaccording to the policy impact of local government on the investment environment.In this article, evolutionary game model is constructed to study the formationprocess of rural-land conversion strategy, analysis the influence factors of strategy oflocal government, finally to find the relationship between the four factors, includingthe degree of free trade, enterprise additional cost, extra return of active behavior andbenefit of enterprise investment; studying the four indirect factors affecting theformation of strategy: Policies implement to affect free trade; penalties affectenterprise extra pay; achievement effect to influence positive behavior extra return;and investment attraction to influence enterprise investment benefit. Jin hai yangindustrial park in Shanxi is taken by empirical research to verified evolution gamemodel, and studies the relationship between influencing factors such as industry typeof different industrial park, investment projects and enterprises.The research shows that:(1) the local government of Jin Hai yang industrial park to implement conservative strategy makes good use of terrain mode of land use.Predominantly agricultural land conversion promotes the formation of parkconservative strategy. If conversion system don`t changes, conservative rural landconversion strategy may be the local government preferred way in the future.(2) The evolutionary game model, built in this paper can provide the analysisframework of relationship between local government strategy and factors. Differentdevelopment model of industrial park, projects and enterprises, land use of park’senterprises, the government’s land investment achievement effect and finance effectcan influence strategy of local government rural land conversion in industrial park.(3) The local government that implements active rural land conversion strategy;the industrial park usually has the following characteristics: the industrial park forforeign enterprises, industrial park is relatively mature, land investment has obviouseffect; conditions have no unique requirements on construction land. The industrialpark with local government implementing conservative strategies usually has theopposite characteristics: the government without huge financial resources, themomentum of economic development is not obvious, enterprise is the localenterprises, and even for the spontaneous enterprises in the park.