Study On The Reverse Logistics Based On Multi-game Model

The12th five year plan of China pointed clearly that in order to enhance the sustainabledevelopment ability, government had called upon people centering on the concept of green,low-carbon, and made cost of energy-wasting and environmental pollution reduced, it hadcalled peoples’ attention to work hard to protect the environment and conserve resources,meanwhile government should advocate enterprises to develop green production, and induceconsumers to have green consumption. Therefore, the problem which was about conservingresources and preventing environment had attracted the public attention, it made the reverselogistics theory and application of waste products had gradually became a hot research field.The mainly purpose of building reverse logistics system of waste products was to reducethe environmental pollution; optimize resource allocation; deduce production cost andmaximum benefits for manufacturing enterprises, while improve the satisfaction of consumers,finally it made the totally social utility attain the Pareto-optimality. The thesis was based onthe game theory to research the construction of waste products reverse logistics; it could belisted as follows:First, the detail description of the effects on development process, which had been madeby government, manufacturing enterprise and consumer had been given. The paper analyzedthe important role of government’s micro control on optimal allocation of resources,supervision and management on market, as well as public welfare; then, discussed the effectswhich the manufacturing enterprise implements the reverse logistics from the perspectives ofdeducing raw material cost, improving consumer satisfaction and promoting green; at last, itpointed the consumers’ influence on the waste products recycling process.Second, the paper introduced two factors which was the governments’ supervisionfrequency and the manufacturing enterprises’ waste production recovery rate, then divided thegame into three mechanisms which were synchronous decision making game,governmentpriority decision-making game and manufacturing enterprises priority decisionsgame,according to the decision priority of government and manufacturing enterprise. then itanalyzed the value of environment loss coefficient and incentive coefficient to discuss thestability of three mechanisms, and pointed the social problems that may be breeding inunstable circumstance. At last, the thesis put forward that government and manufacturingenterprise’s trust level was the basic condition for normal game mechanism. In order topromote enterprise to carry out the waste production reverse logistics, government shouldappropriately adjust incentive compensation coefficient by observing the value ofenvironment loss coefficient.third, the paper analyzed the consumers’ behavior from the point of economics, and talked about its influence on consumer’s decision about taking part in reverse logistics. Thenit discussed the static game and dynamic game under full information between manufacturingenterprise and consumer. Finally, the thesis gave the conclusion that the probability ofconsumer who takes part in reverse logistics and the rate of investment return aboutmanufacturing enterprise had directly effect on carrying out reverse logistics. At same time,the rate of investment return had decided the risk levels that enterprise should undertake.Fourth, the paper focused on the tripartite game among government, manufacturingenterprise and consumer, which included the tripartite one-short game and repeated game, itanalyzed the tripartite Nash equilibrium and the players’ utility under different circumstancethrough modeling. At last the Mat lab had been used to analyze game results of the threerepeated game, and gave the improvement strategies.Fifth, compared with the principal-agent relationship under symmetric information, thepaper discussed the optimal incentive strategy under asymmetric information betweenmanufacturing enterprise and third-party Logistics Company. If the external environmentalconditions were the same, manufacturing enterprise should take into account of the third-partycompany’s special factors when he selects the optimal incentive contract. First, the paperanalyzed the influence of effort levels and abilities of third-party Company about carrying outreverse logistics; then it discussed the interaction between two factors and ultimatelydetermined the share coefficient of the two factors.Finally, the paper gave the specific opinions and suggestions for carrying out reverselogistics in China by combining with its development abroad. At first, government shouldimprove the laws and regulations of waste products of our country, and give a delineation ofplayers’ obligation and duty. Manufacturing enterprise should introduce the concept of ERP,meanwhile establish the long-term goal and pay more attention to the development of reverslogistics in order to promote its development. Consumer should enhance the ownenvironmental awareness actively, and respond to government’s appeal, supportmanufacturing enterprise to carry out the reverse logistics. The third-party logistics companyshould improve itself business capacity continuously to become a very competitive company,so that they could realize the win-win.