Interest Game And Countermeasure Of Approved Urban Construction Land Regulation

In recent years, with the rapid development of economic, the land market has become increasingly active, the measurement of land market degree is also rising. However, the problem of urban land utilization has emerged continuously with the development of urbanization. The phenomenon of illegal land utilization such as reserve of land, using land inefficiently, changing land use or FAR, grey land transactions and so on has become increasingly seriously and is gradually becoming the focus of government and the public.Illegal land use has a lot of negative effects, for example, destroying land market order, resulting in the loss of state-owned assets, harmful to intensive land utilization and the sustainable development. Land use needs government regulation because of being quasi-public goods, its externalities, information asymmetry and so on. However, traditional ideas that approval is more important than regulation deeply influence the government and land regulators. Central government call for people to pay attention to land use regulation by issuing the notification about saving and using land intensively. Since then, the government regulation of approved construction land has been started, but the actual progress of the regulatory effect is not satisfactory.The paper leads the stakeholders of approved land regulation by introducing the background of approved urban construction land regulation, including central government, local government, land enterprises and the public. Then the paper analyses deeply the behavior of each stakeholder. The central government implemented the regulation through the introduction of policies and sent an inspector to supervise and inspect the local government, pursuing the sustainable economic development and social stability. Local government has two contrary idea, on the one hand, he implements the policy actively under the authority of the central government, on the other hand, he implements the policy negatively to maximize the interest. He pursues economic interests, political gains and so on. Land enterprises break the land contract by the way of hoarding land, changing FAR and so on in the pursuit of the profit maximization. The public as the indirect regulation stakeholders has the right to supervise the local government and land enterprises, but he doesn’t play his due role due to lack of motivation.On the basis of the analysis in the regulatory stakeholder’s behavior, the paper respectively builds a game model of central government and local government, local government and land enterprises and local government regulatory disposal. From the game of the central government and local government, we can know that regulatory cost of central government, income of local government implementing the policy actively and negatively, punishment from central government influence the efficiency of regulation. From the game of the local government and land enterprises, regulatory cost of local government, benefits of land enterprises complying with and violating the contract and fine are the key factors. By analyzing the game of local government punishment, whether land enterprises choosing violating the contract is changed by the credit of government regulation. If local government improves the credit of regulatory punishment, land enterprises will dare to choose violate the contract that will promote the efficiency of regulation.With the analysis of the game, the paper uses the approved land regulation of Xinbei District to do an empirical analysis. Through the detailed analysis of the regulation of started construction link and others, we can find that the regulation in Xinbei district moves slowly overall. Based on the question, the paper investigates the causes in depth with the conclusion of game, including decisions deviated of local government in the contradictory plight, too light punishment, the disposal of the incredible threat, weak foundation, monotonous regulatory approach and so on.Finally, the paper proposes countermeasures respectively from the view of the central government and local government. From the perspective of the central government, he should reform the performance evaluation system and increase the supervision of the local government to correct the deviation of the local government. From the perspective of the central government, he can strengthen the law enforcement and innovate the regulatory means to promote the improvement of the regulatory efficiency.