Game Analysis Of Enterprise Training Investment In Human Capital

Domestic enterprises have shown strong development ability and adaptabilitywhen they face the fierce global market competition, and the operation mode ofenterprises has gradually changed from the traditional pattern to a modern mode.Human capital is decided to modern enterprise expansibility and innovation, thusdetermines the source of enterprise survival strength and profitability. Human capitalinvestment has become the focus of enterprise management.As the main form of human capital investment, training is the key factor of thedevelopment of enterprise. Training can improve the stock of human capital in arelatively short period of time, so as to enhance enterprise competitiveness in themarket. Enterprises have paid a lot attention to training, but the human capitalinvestment decision-making, the mode of investment choice, benefits and investmentcost sharing between employee and enterprise, how human capital investmentimplement in enterprises have become key problems of modern enterprise. This paperwill explore the solutions to solve these problems.First, this paper introduces the concept, form, characteristics of enterprise humancapital investment, analysis it’s the cost, profit, risk, and briefly describes the relevantresearch of enterprise training.Secondly, divide training into completely general training, complete specialtraining, special training, and introduce repeated game theory and incompleteinformation dynamic gambling to human capital investment fields, using game theorytrees, by training the most important human capital investment form for example, andprovide a good effect and high maneuverability method for the human capitalinvestment decision.Thirdly, analysis the results, and find out the optimal cost sharing and revenuesharing model in different training methods, which makes the enterprise get thebiggest profit. For completely general training, it is the staff that should bear all thecost and get all the training benefits; For completely special training, it is the enterprises that should bear all the cost and get all the training benefits; For specialtraining, when the penalty is more than the training cost, the optimal choice ofenterprise is to bear all the training cost, and sign a contract with employees beforetraining; when the penalty is less than the training cost, the optimal choice ofenterprise is to make the employees undertake all the cost of training, and then switchthe return to the maximize. But the enterprise should also make sure that employeeswill not hopping.Finally, introduces the application of the game model of human capital traininginvestment in enterprises. Because the availability of training income cannot dowithout the incentive mechanism of the enterprise, so at the end, this paper mostlyfocuses on the explicit incentive mechanism and implicit incentive mechanism ofenterprises.