Research On Risk Sharing And Project Distribution Of The EPC General Contracting Project

With economic globalization, the rapid development of science and technology, and constructionprojects complexity, EPC general contracting project mode has been widely applied, based on thesecharacteristics of Building fast, relatively low cost, fewer disputes in project.Facing enormous risks and high profits, by the integration of external resources,"complementarity"or "powerful combination", EPC contractor together with subcontractors consortium composed ofEPC Project organization, co-signs the EPC contract. The contract can be effectively promote EPCProject of the Commonwealth of risk sharing, and cooperation to achieve win-win situation in thefuture. Uneven risk-sharing as well as unreasonable and unfair distribution of benefits result possiblywill lead to the enthusiasm of subcontractors cooperation, thus affecting the interests of the entireproject further generation, and even lead to the failure of cooperation throughout the Commonwealth.From the formation of the Commonwealth of EPC contractor perspective, the paper will introducethe idea of dynamic alliance into the Commonwealth, and involved in the analysis of EPC projectconsortium risks, the appropriate level of classification by using interpretative structural modeling inthe risks identified, and risk sharing involved members. Based on the risk-sharing by using themodified Shapley value for different stakeholders the paper quantifies the distribution of benefits, andusing of team motivation theory qualitatively analyzed between the general contractor andsubcontractors benefit distribution coefficient and the relevant conclusions in the case of asymmetricinformation. In this paper, the following tasks have been completed:(1)The EPC general contracting project in the identification of risk factors, using the interpretationstructure model (ISM) can transform fuzzy qualitative relationship between risk factors intoquantitative mathematical model, by solving the model, the module between each element of theprimary and secondary relations, determining the sequence of each risk, and risk factors of hierarchylevel division;(2)This paper synthetically takes into account contribution, investment and venture. According toShapley value, fair theory and FAHP theory,it calculates the profit allocations among partners. Thenit educes the final profit allocation by calculating profit allocations with gray correlation and amendsprofit strategy of Shapley value.(3)On the premise of the owner adopt incentive contracts, combination with the characteristics of itself and the subcontractor, using hierarchical risk-taking and project investment factors thecontractor designs the incentive mechanism, and realizing "win-win" with the subcontractor, toexplore interest distribution coefficient between EPC general contractor and the subcontractor, andthrough the team punishment mechanism design to promote the whole EPC general contractingproject consortium to achieve pareto optimality.Finally, long-term cooperation between the generalcontractor and the subcontractor’s can also be out of the EPC general contracting project consortiummembers of "prisoner’s dilemma", and it is concluded that the long-term cooperation in the interests ofthe general contractor and the subcontractor distribution coefficient.