Research On Third Party Logistics Outsourcing Contract Based On Multiple Subcontractors

With the development of economic integration and globalization, Third party logistics under a wide range of interest and attention。It reflects and embodies a level of development the overall level of national logistics industry development. Rapid development of third party logistics in China, However, due to the development of logistics industry in China started relatively late, still relatively low level of development of third party logistics development situation is not optimistic. After joining the WTO, facing competitive threats of international logistics enterprises to enter the Chinese market.Under the dual pressures of the internal inadequate capacity and external market competition, in order to survive and develop, The third-party logistics enterprises begin to integrate external resources, overall planning logistics capabilities available in the market, providing a full range of logistics services for demand-side, which has developed an integrated logistics services, namely, third party logistics outsourcing services.This research based on contract theory, incentive theory, and commissioned agent theory, put the cooperation of third party logistics enterprise and multiple subcontractors due for a commissioned agent problem, through analysis characteristics of information not symmetric in logistics outsourcing, proposed contract design is a solution programme to solute information not symmetric, then list logistics outsourcing of contract design ideas and method, under the more task commissioned agent model, discussion third party logistics enterprise how to develope a reasonable of subcontract contract, let subcontractors meet their constraints and incentive constraints under the premise of participation, to promote the subcontractor can not only realize their own interests, and make for the best selection of third party logistics enterprises, so that the both value can be reasonably achieved, makes the third party logistics enterprise’s expected utility maximization. Study on the front is only from the perspective of incentive, but supervision is an effective strategy to solve the principal problem, for which design combines a supervision and incentive mechanisms, and finally draw the relevant conclusions.Results of this research are (1) based on the theory of principal theory, design based on multiple subcontractors multitasking logistics outsourcing contract model, and under the participation constraint and incentive constraints derive optimal incentive contract of third party logistics enterprises. (2) in multitask multiple subcontractors contract incentive model based on the supervision factor. Then design the incentive contracts combination of supervision and incentives. And to solve and analysis this problem.