Study On Models Of Closed-Loop Supply Chain With Bonus-Malus System Under Asymmetric Information

With the development of society and economy, our demand for electronicproducts show diversity, which promote the innovation of technology, but also tospeed up the elimination of electronic products. These discarded electronic products ifnot handled properly will bring great threat to the environment; on the contrary, thereasonable use can alleviate the problem of resource shortage and environmentpollution. Enterprises actively participate in the recycling of waste electronic productscan not only reduce their costs while establishing a good environmental image, andenhance market competitiveness. Therefore, this closed-loop supply chain researchhas important theoretical and practical significance based on the recycling of wasteelectronic products.This thesis from the perspective of asymmetry information studies on theclosed-loop supply chain, constructed a recycling mode which the manufacturer isdominant and retailer or the third-party recycler is responsible to recycle, includingretailer recycling, the third-party recycler recycling and their competition recycling.Recycling agent party who has its own recycling effort information is informationsuperiority, and the manufacturer who does not know the information is informationdisadvantage. According to the principal-agent theory and information screeningapproach, contract designed by manufacturer for retailer consists of wholesale price,repurchase price and franchise fee, and contract for the third-party recycler consists ofrepurchase price and franchise fee. Recycling agent party chooses the screeningcontract to achieve the purpose of information screening. The situations of withoutbonus-malus system and the government implement bonus-malus system formanufacturer are considered in each recycling mode. Government set thebonus-malus degree and the target of recovery volume, if recycling agent part exceedsthe target will be rewarded and vice punished. The paper establishes the model, setsthe parameters for the numerical simulation, and analyses the sensitivity of mainparameters.After analysis and comparison on the calculation results, the thesis finds thefollowing conclusions:(1) When recycling competition, if retailer and the third-partyrecycler choose high degree of recycling effort, as competition intensifies, theirrecovery volume and expected profit will reduce, and lower than non-competition.(2)In the implementation of bonus-malus system, if retailer and the third-party recycler choose high degree of recycling effort, with the increase of bonus-malus degree, theirrecovery volume and expected profit will add, and higher than no bonus-malus system.(3) When the retailer or the third-party recycler separately recycles the recyclingmode of lower retail price can obtain more recovery volume. Competition makes theexpected profit of the recyling agent part to reduce, which will affect their recyclinginitiative; however, the implementation of bonus-malus system can compensate theloss brought by competition, and bring profit for the recyling agent part. Therefore,the implementation of bonus-malus system for manufacturer in the closed-loop supplychain can effectively guide the recovery.