Research On Supply Chain Coordination Scheme Of Supply Delivery Time Put Forward Based On Promotion Of E-commerce

As the development of E-Commerce, the most significant promotion like double-eleven or other major holidays, Christmas the like, emerged,makes the quantities of orders much bigger than usual amount of customers’ demands growing exponentially. And merchandise promoted in double-eleven or other big days full of festive atmosphere generally have non-rigid and timely characteristics. If the retailers can not meet the demands generated in a short time, the demands are very likely losing. For the e-commerce-based sellers, loss happens if a seller does not deliver customers’ orders within tolerable time, for physical stores that directly facing the customers if customer’s needs can not be met timely, the customers will flow to other stores, causing loss of orders as the same. Having these very large demands of timeliness generation for retailers, to increase customers’ retentions, improve customer service level, thus increase their profits, they will deliberately bring the arrival time of supplied goods forward, especially while the supply chain is consist of several retailers to one supplier. In these kinds of one to many two-stage supply chain, once taking promotion, suppliers have to face the problem that each retailer’s sales will be greatly increased, but due to capacity constraints, the probability of suppliers’ delivery time will be reduced, which is the uncertainty of supply. To reduce this supply uncertainty, the retailers would put ahead time of supply delivery arrival deliberately. Due to the presence of delivery time ahead, the retailers’ profits increase, but suppliers’ crash costs will be greatly increased, either. To resolve this conflict, to achieve the supply chain collaboration, three models are established based on a large number of scholar researches in this article using price leverage method. Those three models are the traditional model, Nash equilibrium model, Stackelberg game model. And, a numerical example is given to verify the results of solutions of the modes above. And the following conclusions is drawn: under Stackelberg game model supplier’s profit and margins of overall supply chain are optimal, and in this model, supplier’s amount of raising the wholesale price is the highest, whist accordingly lead time hedging retailers given is minimal. Profits of supplier and overall supply chain resulting from Nash equilibrium model are between Stackelberg game model and the traditional model, and enhancement rate of wholesale price as well as the lead time hedging are also between the other two models. Under the traditional model, the supply chain overall profit is minimal, but the retailers’ obtained profits are the largest of the three models. So under normal circumstances promotions, driven by the interests of profits, retailers are due to bring the arrival of goods delivery forward. Thus, it is necessary to put forward some method to improve supply chain’s coordination, namely the introduction of supplier’s wholesale price increasing mechanism.