Research On Engineering Supervision Risk Charging Model

While the rapid development of the national economy, supervision industry has been relatively stable development and has made outstanding contributions to economic growth and employment problems. At present, with the supervision of the government to take the cost of cancellation, supervision fees are in accordance with the market price adjustment. Then the supervision of the industry has ushered in a new challenge. It is important to prevent disorderly market supervision harsh competition and ensure the quality of supervision of construction projects. It is imperative to construct a new supervision fee model.The main research contents of this article are as follows:First, through the study of a large number of literatures, this article sums up the related theories and elaborates the contact between the theory and the role of each theory. This paper bases on the principal-agent theory, by using game theory, analyzes risks sharing between owners and supervision enterprises. Then the research results of this paper are carried out through the contract theory.Secondly, this paper analyzes the existing problems of the agency relationship between owners and supervision enterprises. By the use of game theory, risks sharing were analyzed in signed phases to determine the factors that influence risk-sharing capacity index. Through the actual case calculation, it builds sharing risk assessment model to determine their respective risk sharing ratio. In addition, this paper analyzes the strategic behavior and the benefit function of the participating parties in the contract execution stage to obtain the game equilibrium solution. Then it constructs the game model of anti-collusion from the perspective of owner's.Finally, this article designs the special provisions of the contract for supervision risk charging model, so that the risk charging model can be embodied by the form of the contract. In addition, in combination with the internal and external environment, the corresponding incentive and restraint mechanisms are put forward to promote the smooth implementation of the model.