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Research On The Vulnerability Of Extreme Group Conflict

Posted on:2018-01-13Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:D LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2346330533966063Subject:Technical Economics and Management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years, the group conflict has shown a new trend of small incentives, low sentiment and low evolution of events, and most of the group conflict were evolved into extreme smashing and burning, it posed a great challenge to government's emergency managemen. In this paper,we study the vulnerable mechanism of group conflict under the vulnerability factors, which can not maintain the state of peace to the extreme state of smashing and burning, and provide the theoretical support for the emergency management of the government.This paper used literature research, case analysis, gray relational analysis, random mutation and evolutionary game theory as research tools, using the combination of empirical and model mechanism to study the of the vulnerability of extreme group conflict. First of all, analysed the status quo, problems and causes of extreme conflict under new situation. Then, through the intensive reading of the literature and combing 33 typical cases, found seven key vulnerable factors. Then, by means of random mutation theory and evolutionary game theory, we studyed the evolution mechanism of vulnerability of extreme group conflict from the dual perspectives of discontinuity and continuous behavioral. a. Considering the key vulnerable factors, the participant behavior evolution model is established, and the critical region of behavior mutation is found by topology transformation and mathematical analysis. The results show that when the influencing factor value crosses the critical point, the participant's behavior will undergo structural jump, when the influencing factor is in the disagreement area, the participant's behavior will be disturbed by random interference. b. Established "local government- participant", as well as "local government-network media participant" tripartite game model respectively,comprehensive study the parties interaction mechanism in the evolution of group conflict. The results show that the additional benefits, the cost of the struggle and the punishment of the local governments to the extreme protest participants are the key factors influencing the game behavior of the direct stakeholders. There are two evolutionary stability points in the specific scenario, the three-way evolution of the game shows the "initial value sensitive" feature,when the initial participant involved in the conflict ratio is low,when the network media blocking strategy can take the crowd to participate in group conflict, System brittle excitation; the initial participant to participate in the high proportion of group conflict, the participant can lead to network media selection to promote the strategy to stimulate the system brittle;The optimal probability of the selection and participant' participation strategy. In order to avoid the evolution of the behavior selection to the extreme direction of the vulnerability, the measures to reduce the optimal probability are proposed. Finally, based on the previous research results, the vulnerable risk diffusion path of extreme conflict is given, and the feasible vulnerable risk control strategy is put forward.
Keywords/Search Tags:Group conflict, Extreme conflict, Vulnerability, Random mutation, Evolutionary game
PDF Full Text Request
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