The First-time Transaction Coordination Mechanism Of B2B E-supply Chain With Incomplete Trust

With the rapid development of network as well as the increasingly standard of e-commerce environment,electronic trading has already become a trend that cannot be resisted.Lots of manufacturers and retailers set up their own websites or enter the third party e-commerce platform for network sale and electronic trading,which realized the transition of traditional supply chain to that electronic.At present,the B2 B electronic supply chain is one of the most active and important pattern in electronic market.And with advantages of short delivery cycle、low transaction cost and high flexibility of that,the channel efficiency and performance of supply chain members will be improved largely.However,the reality that parties mutually incomplete trust in trading environment always make the electronic transactions break out,which is obviously in the trading for the first time and that restricted the coordination of B2 B electronic supply chain to a larger degree.In this regard,the paper studies how to build an effective coordination mechanism to incentive electronic trading under incomplete trust.Firstly,the situation where the buyer incomplete trusts the seller under self-built platform in the first-time transaction is considered.Introducing the buyer’s trust into electronic trading so as to analyze the influence of that on the transaction.Results show that buyer’s incomplete trust leads to the small batch ordering strategy,which will reduce channel efficiency of B2 B electronic supply chain largely.Faced this,the seller compensation mechanism is used to resolve contradictions,which will decrease buyer’s risk assessment,so as to increase the trusts degree and father incentive first transaction effectively.And the effective interval of compensation ratio is given at last.Secondly,the situation where the seller incomplete trusts the buyer under self-built platform in the first-time transaction is considered.Likewise,introducing seller’s trust into first-time transaction and then to compare the results that trust or not to make sure the negative effects of seller’s.Results show that,wholesale price is higher than that trust under seller’s incomplete trust action.And this in turn leads to lower channel volume.Therefore,buyer’s advance payment mechanism is built to solve this problem.It can ensure the seller gets cost compensation in advance and with that to enhance their resistance for the risk,so as to incentive the first-time transaction.In addition,within the scope of critical trust and critical advance payment,the advance coordination mechanism is still effective.Finally,on the basis of the above,the situation where parties incomplete trust each other in the first-time transaction is considered.Assumed that the trading platform is third party,and then to establish the transaction model.There includes three kinds of risk assessment,to be specific,buyer’s risk assessment is less than the seller,equal to the seller or greater than the seller.Particularly,when that risk assessments of parties are consistent,the channel profit is averaged,so the buyer profit is equal to the seller.Then,aiming at the condition that buyer’s risk assessment is less than the seller or otherwise,buyer down-payment incentive mechanism and compensation incentive mechanism are presented.Likewise,the effective intervals of these two incentive mechanism are given.The results reveal that these two kinds of incentive mechanism are able to increase the possibility of first transaction and improve both profits largely.