Research On The Behavior Choice Of The Village Committee In The Farmland Transfer

At present,the farmland transfer market and the intermediary organizations are not perfect.As a local government policy and rural link hub,the Village Committee plays an important role in the farmland transfer.Under the economic,political interests and their own incentives,it also has a strong need to participate in,to a certain extent it promotes the scale of land transfer,management and village economic development.Of course there are some problems such as damaging the interests of farmers,intervening in farmland transfer prices and other issues,and even hinder the development of farmland transfer market.With the continuous development of agricultural modernization and farmland transfer,it should redefine the status and role of the Village Committee in the farmland transfer,and regulate the relevant behavior of the Village Committee to participate in the farmland transfer.Based on the theoretical analysis framework,this chapter research on the behavior choice of Village Committee,and regard the "farmland transfer policy promotion-reconstruction of land rights and interests--the rational decision-making" as the main line of theoretical research.First of all,we consider the theoretical analysis of the Village Committee's behavior choice in the farnland transfer from the internal environment and external environment,those are the factors which influence on the behavior of the Village Committee,the internal environmental impact refers to the internal characteristics of the Village Committee,such as the Village Committee's land rights,its nature and social service management functions,the external environment mainly from the district,county and township government policy driven and land market demand driven by the transfer.Then,the paper select four village cases in Jingjiang City,and analyzes the behavior and driving of the Village Committee,then analyzes the commonality and difference between the different behavior choices of the Village Committee.Finally,according to the theoretical and case analysis,this paper puts forward the general requirements of the farmland transfer in China at the present stage,the practical reference and optimization basis for the Village Committee behavior selection in different villages.This paper draws the following main conclusions:1.From the view of Village Committee's participation in the process and effect of farmland transfer,the behavior of Village Committee affected the efficiency of farmland transfer policy and the development of villages.From the microscopic view of farmland transfer,the Village Committee even played a decisive role.Thus,we can think about the Village Committee in the agricultural and other economic activities in the internal and external environment and how to rebuild,in order to make it play an active role.2.The ultimate goal of the behavior of the Village Committee is to realize the maximization of its own interests.The interests of the Village Committee may include the pursuit of tangible and intangible assets such as political promotion,land resources,construction land index,policy subsidies and service management remuneration.Eventually,the Village Committee participates in the farmland transfer which oriented the interest demand as the standard.3.If the driving force of the behavior of the Village Committee is different,it is involved in the farmland transfer has obvious differences.The greater the intensity of the implementation of national policy,the greater the desire of the Village Committee to participate in the farmland transfer,it is more inclined to participate in the identity of the leader,so the main driver of behavior is the policy intervention.When the market demand is reflected in the case of strong,the Village Committee is more inclined to choose to the identity of the intermediary to participate in farmland transfer.4.The degree of the Village Committee to intervene the farmland transfer is higher,the more responsibility and obligation to bear,the corresponding commitment to the higher economic risk.On the contrary,as the intermediary involved in the farmland transfer,the Village Committee is more of a role in the connection and management,the farmer and the Village Committee did not occur in the actual interest relationship,the Village Committee as the guarantor through the tenant to collect land reclamation security and other means to control the risk of the way occur.