Research On The Reward Distribution Of Police Cooperation In Grassroots Public Security Organs

On February 6th,2015,the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council issued the Framework Opinions and Programs on Several Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Public Security Reform.The opinions and programs suggested the construction of a coordinated,integrated,unified and efficient architecture of domestic security work.This is the requirements of the new era for the police cooperation of grassroots public security organs to combat various new types of crimes and cross-regional crimes.If there is cooperation,there will be division of labor.If there is division of labor,there must be corresponding reward distribution.The evaluation system guides work behavior.The scientific and institutionalized level of reward distribution in police cooperation of grassroots public security organs determines the level initiative that grassroots public security organs take in combating various new types of crimes and cross-regional crimes.This study selected Beijing,Kashgar,Hangzhou,Shenzhen and other places as samples,conducted interviews and surveys on the problems and factors affecting the distribution of incentives in police cooperation conducted by grassroots public security organs in various regions.Through Grounded Theory,the factors affecting the system of distribution of incentives in police cooperation were obtained,and contrasted by Analytic Hierarchy Process and Fuzzy Comprehensive Evaluation Method.Finally,based on the Cooperative Game Theory,a prize distribution model of police cooperation in grassroots public security organs based on Shapley value is constructed.The results show that:(1)The factors affecting the distribution of incentives for police cooperation include input factors(mainly including police equipment,police technology and police force),contribution factors(mainly including: cooperative attitude,effort,information and intelligence,incidence and detection rate),risk factors(mainly including cooperation risk and management risk)and mechanism factors(mainly including incentives: indicators and financial guarantees).(2)For the input factors,contribution factors and risk factors affecting the distribution of incentives for police cooperation,the Analytic Hierarchy Process and the Fuzzy Comprehensive Evaluation Method can be used to calculate the input coefficient,contribution coefficient and risk coefficient.(3)Considering the limitations of Shapley value in Cooperative Game Theory,the paper integrates the three factors that affect the distribution of police cooperative rewards,and constructs an improved Shapley value reward distribution model which takes into consideration comprehensive factors,and thus provides a concrete scheme for the reward distribution of police cooperation of grassroots public security organs.(4)Policy suggestions on incentive distribution of police cooperation in grassroots public security organs: first,to improve the performance evaluation mechanism of incentive distribution in police cooperation;second,to strengthen the implementation system of incentive distribution;third,to improve the legal and regulatory system of incentive distribution in police cooperation.