The Multi-Agent Interest Game Study Of Abandoned Food Recycling In China

With the development of society,the recycle and disposal of waste food has been paid more and more attention.The improper recycle and disposal of waste food will not only damage people's physical and mental health,but also result in the waste of resources and environmental pollution.Taking expired food as an example,resell it after tampering with production date or recycle it as raw material of food,etc,which is not only difficult to be tested,but also can cause great harm to consumers'physical and mental health.In recent years,although the relevant laws and regulations on food safety are constantly improved and the corresponding supervision is increasingly strengthened,the recycle and disposal of waste food is still easy to be ignored.At present,the system construction of the recycle and disposal of expired food in China is still in the initial stage,and the construction of relevant laws and regulations is not perfect.Most food production enterprises still aim to maximize profits,and the management of expired food is not properly handled.Therefore,taking the expired food as an example,this paper firstly analyzes the current situation and problems of the recycle and disposal of expired food in China,then constructs a multi-agent game model based on the typical recovery model that the retailers are responsible for the recycle and the manufacturers take charge of the disposal,and puts forward some suggestions by solving the game model and analyze the stability of the results,which aim to provide theoretical basis for solving the problem of the recycle and disposal of expired food and provide theoretical reference for the formulation of related laws.According to the Food Information Center and the web site called "Throw out the Window",this paper analysis the news reports about expired food in China in recent years.The statistic analysis shows that the new Food Safety Law has played an important role on restriction to the market and food enterprises.Through the analysis of Shanghai Fu Xi "expired meat" event and good Neighbor expired food event,this paper shows that the main problems of the recycle and disposal of expired food in China are:(1)The retailers knowingly break the law;(2)The manufacturers and so on recycle and dispose the expired food illegally and no-openly;(3)It's hard to collect evidence about the illegal disposal of expired food;(4)The existing legal system is imperfect.In this paper,evolutionary game theory is used to analyze the relevant stakeholders of the recycle and disposal of expired food--retailers,manufacturers and government regulatory departments.The results show that:(1)For the retailers,when the cost of the recycle expired food is less than the comprehensive earnings what the retailers get from it,the recycle strategy will be adoptted;if not,the retailers' recycle strategy depends on the degree of the government's regulatory effort.(2)And for the manufacturers,the strategy of the manufacturers depends on the degree of the government's regulatory effort when the comprehensive earnings of formal disposal is less than the informal disposal.(3)And for the government department,its strategy depends on the degree of the expected gain and expected cost.Therefore,under the precondition that the manufacturers' earnings of formal disposal is less than that of the informal disposal,six stable strategy points can be getted from the analysis of the three-party evolutionary game:(non-recycle,informal disposal,non-regulation),(recycle,informal disposal,non-regulation),(non-recycle,informal disposal,regulation),(recycle,informal disposal,regulation),(non-recycle,formal disposal,regulation)and(recycle,formal disposal,regulation).Finally,the changes of the key parameter are introduced into the model to analyze the influence on the strategy selection.The results show that:(1)Under the premise of the non-regulation strategy of the government department,the retailers will choose the recycle strategy if the recycle earnings is more than the cost.And for the manufacturers,when the earnings of the formal disposal is more than the informal disposal,the manufacturers will take the formal disposal strategy,otherwise the manufacturers will take the informal processing strategy.(2)In the context of the regulation strategy of the government,the manufacturers are driven by huge informal earnings,the measures of reducing informal disposal earnings or increasing fines of the manufacturers' informal behavior will lose function.The government needs to take further measures to punish the manufacturers for their illegal action,such as closing down illegal enterprises.For the government,in the strategy of(non-recycle,formal processing,regulation),the change of the government's regulation cost or the subsidy to the manufacturers has no impact on its choice.When the cost of the regulation or the subsidy to retailers' changes,there is no impact on its policy choice,and the subsidy to manufacturers can have an impact on its choice for the strategy of(recycle,formal disposal,regulation).That is,when the government increases the subsidies to manufacturers,the speed of their selection of regulation strategy has slowed down significantly.The study of the recycle and disposal of expired food in China at present mains in the status quo and policy recommendations and lack the study of the theoretical model.The innovation of this paper is,dealing with the issue of the recycle and disposal of expired food,to use evolutionary game theory to construct the three-party evolutionary game model of the retailers,the manufacturers and the government department and analyze the relationship between the three parties.Under the premise of guaranteeing the stability of the model results,the parameter changes' are introduced into the model to discuss the influence on the strategy selection,it will provide the reference for the study of the recycle and disposal of expired food.