| This dissertation explores the phenomenon of collective international intervention in light of the theory of international relations. The author argues that the collective pattern of international intervention is a result of balance of power in the international system, as suggested by the realist hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, balance of power imposes constraints on unilateral intervention and induces the great powers to intervene collectively: since no single power is strong enough to intervene alone, a number of great powers intervene together to control the distribution of gains among themselves. The opposing view, held by constructivism, explains the collective pattern of intervention by the influence of international norms: great powers intervene collectively since the multilateral form of intervention allows them to earn international legitimacy.; The author proceeds to test the realist and constructivist hypotheses on collective interventions. Since systematic data on interventions within his time frame is lacking (17–20th centuries), he compiles a new dataset on interventions on the basis of historical, diplomatic and statistical sources. Using this dataset, he explores the relationship between the distribution of power and the pattern of intervention in the international system. His findings, consistent with the realist hypothesis, are that collective interventions were more frequent during the periods of balance of power.; In the following chapters, the author turns to case studies of great power interventions in the 19th century Ottoman Empire and in the former Soviet Union of the post-Cold War era. He demonstrates that in all cases the distribution of power played a decisive role in shaping the pattern of international intervention. |
