Research On The Performance Appraisal Of County-Level Government Civil Servants From The Perspective Of Compound Interest Equilibrium

Since the 1970 s,with the rise of the new public management movement,the government reform characterized by performance management in western countries has been carried out in depth.The performance management of the Chinese government is also gradually advancing.In the process of performance management reform of governments at all levels,performance appraisal has become an important part of testing the work of civil servants,and an important means and method to measure the level of public services of governments at all levels.With the rapid economic and social development,the continuous increase in the economic strength of our country’s county-level government has formed a contrast with the current government’s stable and unchanging level of public services.The backwardness of the county-level government’s civil servant assessment mechanism cannot meet the needs of the current government construction.The construction of an efficient and honest civil servant team of the county government has become a key link in the human resource management and development of the county government.Because county-level government civil servants who integrate national,social,and personal interests bear huge responsibilities and missions.In recent years,although academics and government officials have continuously explored and improved the performance appraisal of county-level government civil servants,the performance appraisal of county-level government civil servants has not yet formed a unified system in China due to the different basic conditions of each county across the country and the complexity of the performance appraisal practice,so there are still many problems to be solved in the process of performance appraisal,which affect the balance of the compound interests of civil servants in the county government.From the perspective of compound interest balance,this paper analyze the performance of civil servants in county-level government,makes an empirical study on the performance appraisal of county-level government civil servants in C city and R county,analyzes the problems existing in the performance appraisal of county-level government civil servants from special to general,and also puts forward the path choice for the performance appraisal of civil servants in the county-level government to realize the optimization of behavioral incentives.Research shows that although the performance appraisal of civil servants in county-level government in our country is quite effective,there are still problems that need to be further resolved,such as insufficient target orientation of performance appraisal,single appraisal subject,uniform appraisal objects,and lack of feedback on appraisal results.In this way,failing to stimulate the new needs of county-level government civil servants will induce county-level government civil servants to make negative behavior,and breaking the original state of compound interest balance,the government performance will inevitably be greatly compromised.However,it is necessary to re-examine the system design in order to ensure the effective play of the evaluation and the incentive function of county-level government civil servants and ensure the realization of performance in the human resource management and development of county-level government.Based on the theory of compound interest equilibrium incentive,this paper puts forward the path selection of performance evaluation optimization of county-level government civil servants from the aspects of assessment objectives,assessment subjects,assessment standards,system guarantees,aiming to improve the work enthusiasm of county-level government civil servants and improve the performance of county-level government.