Research On Waste Recycling Logistics Mode Of Agricultural Production Means

The report to the 19th National Congress put forward the rural revitalization strategy and the general requirements of "thriving industries,livable ecology,civilized village style,effective governance and a prosperous life".In order to realize the goal of "ecological livable",it is necessary to strengthen the rural ecological governance.However,with the improvement of the level of agricultural modernization,the investment of agricultural production means increases,the waste of agricultural production means produces a large number,environmental pollution,food safety and human health problems caused by the waste of agricultural production means become increasingly prominent,the waste of agricultural production means becomes a difficulty in rural ecological management.How to solve the problem of waste treatment of agricultural means of production has become an urgent problem.Firstly,through a comprehensive analysis of relevant literature,this paper sorted out the current situation of agricultural waste recycling and its recycling logistics mode,and clarified the main constraints affecting the recycling of agricultural waste.Secondly,based on the above research and the "extension of production responsibility system",the paid recovery logistics model of agricultural resources enterprises under the government reward and punishment mechanism is designed,and the three-party evolutionary game model of this model is constructed for evolutionary stability analysis,and the key factors affecting the model’s evolutionary stability are deeply analyzed.Thirdly,the system dynamics model is built based on the tripartite evolutionary game model,and different evolutionary states are simulated and analyzed by adjusting parameters to further explore the specific evolutionary path.Finally,the paper provides countermeasures and theoretical references for the realization of paid recycling logistics mode of agricultural materials enterprises under the government reward and punishment mechanism.The research shows that:(1)Increasing the fine to farmers is beneficial to improving the participation of the government and farmers.But the fine to farmers should not be too high,because there will be a mutual restriction relationship with other parameters.Only when the penalty to farmers is less than a certain value,increasing the penalty to agricultural enterprises and reducing the subsidy to agricultural enterprises can improve the probability of the government to implement the policy.When the subsidies to farmers are increased and the difference between farmers’ planting income is larger,the probability of farmers’ active participation will be higher.(2)When the cost paid by the government for implementing policies,the income of public trust and the subsidies given by the government to agricultural resources enterprises meet different conditions,the government’s strategy choice will evolve to different stable states,and the size of the impact of the cost paid by the government for implementing policies and the income of public trust will affect the speed of evolution.(3)The factor of imposing fines on farmers has more influence on farmers’ strategic choice than on the government’s strategic choice.(4)When the cost of implementing the policy is large,it is more effective to increase the penalty to agricultural enterprise than to reduce the subsidy to agricultural enterprise.