Research On Cosntruction Supply Chain Coordination And Optimization Based On Computational Experiment

Complexity during construction management sometimes cause complex system behavior and difficult. It requests researchers and managers translate concept and way with cross-integrating of the theories of project management, supply chain management, CAS to explore construction supply chain management theory and improve construction efficiency. Difficulties during construction supply chain management are multi-objects, multi-agents behavior, heterogeneity of multi-agent and complexity caused by interactive behavior between multiply participants. Computational experiments show significance on the research of behaviors, emergency, and the relation between micro-level and macro-level systems. As a typical complex system, the construction supply chains are a suitable study subject to the method of computational experiments which to be a good solution for solving its complexity. This paper studied construction supply chain coordination and optimization based on computational experiment and the qualitative quantitative method. The main conclusion included:(1) Core idea of construction supply chain is integration, coordination and sharing, coordination and optimization of CSC is a complex systematic issue leads by human with which numerous elements, different levels, complex relationship, and multi-objectives, will lead question understanding and the solution should consider the thought and the method of system management and complexity management.(2) Adopting a life-cycle perspective, this paper focuses on time compression in construction projects, and builds an agent-based model on revenue-sharing negotiation. We design three experimental scenarios:only owner has fairness preference, only contractor has fairness preference, both owner and contractor have fairness preferences. Our aim is to find how agents'fairness preferences impact feasible region of agreements, results of successful negotiations and efficiency in negotiations. Results are as follows:raising agents'fairness preferences will compress the feasible region. When agents raise their fairness preferences properly, it will lead to a significant compression in construction time. However, when agents pay attention to fairness preferences excessively, it will lead to substantial cost growth and it is not conducive to growth of profit. Agents'different fairness preferences will take different effects on their profits. Appropriate fairness preferences of agents can improve the success rate of negotiations and shorten the negotiation periods.(3) Mixing plant resource management is quite important to concrete production and distribution. This Paper build an experimental model based on sharing of the cost of concrete mixing plant considering multi-contractors share their Mixing plants and transportation. Result shows:cost-sharing can reduce the number of mixing plants; resource sharing can reduce cost of mixing plant construction and management, simultaneously improve the efficiency of mixing plant; cost sharing is an effective coordination mechanism to achieve the purpose of construction cost optimization and resource sharing.(4) This paper studied one owner and many contractors construction system in construction supply chain, in which the owner used revenue incentive model to stimulate contractors on project quality optimization and coordination. We built multi-stage incentive model on condition that contractors had fairness perceptions based on project total life cycle, and did some analysis on performance and evolution under different incentive dynamics by computational experiment. Results showed that: revenue incentive is an effective method for owner; individual fairness perceptions had negative influence on incentive performance;"Moderate principle" and "System Thinking" should be followed when owner draft incentive dynamics;"Evolution concept" is important to achieve sustained efficient incentive efficiency.(5) This paper analyzes duration risk source, control strategies and assessment methods. Considering the risk transmission characteristics and the owner' delay reward system, three-sharing strategies between contractors are constructed to calculate the experimental model. By comparing the three risk-sharing strategies, studies have shown that:different risk-sharing strategy led to different effect for duration risk control. Reasonable risk-sharing mechanism can fully mobilize the enthusiasm and initiative of contractor members to achieve the goal of better control of duration risk.(6) This paper analyzes collaborative decision-making and its process during technological innovation in construction supply chain, and builds the corresponding calculation of experimental model. Results show that:knowledge background is necessary when selecting members for collaborative decision-making; the better the communication mechanism, the higher the degree of consensus decision-making within the organization, and the sooner the organization to make the right decisions; When the decision-making knowledge is concentrated in certain area, decision scheme can be formed in a relatively short time, its efficient is higher than when decision-making knowledge is dispersed in several areas.