| Higher education in China has changed dramatically and achieved prominent accomplishment since 1978. We can explain the situation in many ways, though, the most essential reason rests with the continuously institutional vicissitude and innovation on higher education. Institutional vicissitude and innovation mean the new and more efficient institution substitutes for the past one in which the power and responsibility of several relative power principal parts go through re-collocation and re-orientation frequently. During the forepart of the transforming stage, the character of Chinese higher education institutional vicissitude remains with the typical compulsion which is the outcome forced by government from above to below, but with the reformation development and the changes of potence and status among the power main parts, the ways of institutional vicissitude go through more and more complicated in which the Contrastive relations and game ways among such four forces as central government, local government, universities and society play a determining role. This dissertation attempts to discuss and explain how the power main parts carry through power game and the processes and ways of power game influence the new power equilibrium and the relationship among the parts during the institutional vicissitude on Chinese higher education.It is known to all that the ultimate goals of institutional vicissitude on higher education in China are set to put in order the five relationships between central government and local governments, government and universities, university and university, universities and societies, and among university's intramural power structures, so as to promote the whole development of the higher education, in which the harmonious relations between central and local governments and between government and universities are the key to harmonize the other three relationships as well as keystone of institutional reformation of higher education. Therefore, the dissertation aims to make clear the following major issues through detailed researches: After repeated and multiple games among the power structures, what and how changes have happened to the power relationships between central and local government and between government and universities? What stages have the abovefive relationships have stepped in? What are their future goals and what problems need to be solved? And so on.The first chapter of this dissertation is an introduction, discussing the concepts and characters of power. It also brings forward the major topics to be studied and briefly analyzes the research status in quo and methodology related to the thesis. As the theoretical basis and analyzing instrument of the thesis research, the second chapter discusses in detail several main viewpoints of institution and game theories, especially those of Douglass C. North and Karl Marx, as well as those of John Nash and Thomas C. Schelling. Furthermore the author has designed two models about benefit game and power game between central and local governments based on the common relational characteristics between them, related views of game theories and some essential hypothesizes. According to the models and mathematical operation, the author has deduced the best equilibrium solutions and other conclusions of the two game models. The best equilibrium solutions and other related conclusions of power game model have been used to analyze the characteristics of higher educational power game relationship between central and local government at the transforming stage, which has brought to some achievements for the first time. The third chapter emphatically probes into how the institutional circumstance (such as political, economical and educational ones) has influenced the Chinese higher educational development during the four phases of the transforming stage. The author also briefly analyzes the institutional characteristics of modern higher education, their relative administration popedom as well as "the Yan-an Pattern" and "the Soviet Union Pattern" which deeply influenced the institutional vicissitude course of Chinese higher education.This dissertation lays great emphasis on Chapters Four, Five and Six, aiming to make clear the characteristics of power relations, manners and features of power games between central and local governments as well as between government and universities. By studying and analyzing a great number of literatures on higher educational policies and laws during the four phases of the transforming stage, and basing on original quantifying means, the author quantifies all power structures of theseven system types of higher education. According to the quantifying results and combining the qualitative and comparative methods, the author investigates and analyzes in great detail the evolved characters of power field, power relationship as well as the manners and features of power game among such power structures as central government, local government, government, universities and societies, from which the author has educed some particular conclusions. Chapter Seven probes into the power types and their main roles in great detail within Chinese universities, and makes a comparative analysis of some typical power game models between the Western and Chinese universities. Still, the author put forward several principia to reconstruct the power game types within our universities. Chapter Eight summarizes the research about the thesis.According to the above researches, the author has got the following ten conclusions, all of which except the eighth are educed or discovered for the first time in the field of Chinese higher education.Firstly, up till now one of main achievements attained in the system reforms of higher education in China is that we have basically made clear the responsibility and power relationship between central and local governments as well as the interrelations between universities. However, the next emphasis of the reform will be laid on making clear the interrelations between government and universities, the intramural power structures within universities, and between university and society, in which the most important factor should be institutional innovation.Secondly, the types of Chinese higher education system at the transforming stage have involved from "the extremely central unitarianism" at the first phase, "the highly central unitarianism" at the second phase, "the moderately central unitarianism" at the third phase to "the moderately local decentralism" at the fourth phase. The central government has been decentralizing its higher education power during the four phases, and during the first three phases, the local government had been enhancing its higher education which began to decrease at the fourth phase. This probably means that the local government has also begun to descend its power. Besides, the power value of both local government and universities has respectively exceeded that of the centralgovernment for the first time. The author believes that this discovery will probably be of much importance, because it indicates that Chinese higher education system has come into a new era of decentralism which was very unusual in the history of Chinese higher education. The conclusion will be further confirmed by the research results from the power game model.Thirdly, the courses of power game patterns between Chinese government and universities have involved from "the extremely governmental despotism" at the first phase, "the more strongly governmental despotism" at the second phase, "the much strongly governmental dominance" at the third phase till "the moderately governmental dominance" at the fourth phase. Although the government power has descended greatly and the power of universities has increased largely, the power value of the former still doubles that of the latter, which is the main cause that the universities still felt scant on their independence after they greatly enlarged their self-determination power for running a school. At present, the power game pattern between government and universities is developing toward "the moderate university dominance".Fourthly, the power game manners of higher education between central and local governments differ at different phases of the transforming stage, which were mainly the concealed power game at the first phase, the gray color power game at the second phase, the initiative power game at the third phase and the mixture power game at the four phase, respectively. Yet, the conditions for the apparent power game to come into being in China's higher education are still immature.Fifthly, there are four characters of higher educational power game between central and local governments at the transforming stage, namely, non-criterion, compulsion, non-equilibrium and arrangement. The emphasis of the power game characters differ at the different phases, that is, the first and second phases are mainly characterized with non-criterion and compulsion, but the third and fourth phases primarily with non-equilibrium and arrangement.Sixthly, in the process of power game between central and local governments, it is the central government to get greater benefits and the local government just gotlimited boon. During the course that the central government "initiatively" decentralized their powers while the local government "initiatively" enhanced their powers, the powers decentralized were mainly those the central government couldn't execute well or shouldn't get at all. However, the leading power of reformation and the deciding power of policy-making are controlled by central government all the time. The primary power the local government got was the resource-planning, but after canceling the graduate distribution policy and actualizing the policy of graduate applying jobs themselves, one of the most important resources, the personnel resource, has mostly lost its meaning to planning, resulting in unfair competition among different districts — on one hand, the developed areas will be great winners while the less developed won't worth the candle, but on the other hand, the developed will also pay a high price, owing to the personnel depreciation caused by the increasing phenomena of "one's business below his capacity".Seventhly, in the process of power game between government and universities, the main winners were a few of key universities co-constructed by central and local governments, and others were not as good as before instead.Eighthly, the power structures within Chinese universities were extremely unbalanced as the Party power always outmatched all other power structures. The phenomenon of "Party supervising administration" was much at large, and the phenomenon of "laypeople supervising experts" was also very common. Beside the Party power, administrative power was excessively strong, learning power was very weak, students' power was much tiny and social power was unimportant, which all contravened the essentials of universities. To make clear the power relationship within universities should be turned into the keystone of Chinese educational system reformation at the next phase.Ninthly, in the seven kinds of higher educational systems, the strength and range of power-descending are of great disparity. It is very strange and uncommon that the power of education-teaching system most closely related to the independence power of running schools was descended the least, to which the related leaders should pay great attention. What's more, some kinds of powers which the educational rules and laws have definitely granted to universities are still hung up, so the related departments of the central government should take determined steps to execute thepowers.Tenthly, according to the benefit and the power game model between central and local governments, and by some necessary hypotheses and mathematic operations, the author has worked out the conclusion as follows: The best equilibrium solution of the benefit game between the central and local government is {p-pt+pt2l3, pt-pt2l3}, and then we can get its concrete numbers by some initial conditions. The best equilibrium solution of the power game between the central and local government is: (1) For the decentralized countries, the best angle of power elevation is: a=36.86, the power difference and the number of power wastage are 0.2, the central power is 0.59986, the local power is 0.8001, and the best proportion of the central power to the local power is C:L=0.7497:1; (2) For the centralized countries, the best angle of power elevation is: a=53.14, the power difference and the number of power wastage are 0.2, the central power is 0.8001, the local power is 0.59986, and the best proportion of the central power to the local power is C:L=13338:1.
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