| John Foster Dulles was one of the most controversial secretaries of state in U. S. history, and his role in shaping American Cold War foreign policy has received close historical scrutiny. One of the more controversial aspects of his secretaryship concerned Sino-American relations. This study focuses on his role in formulating and implementing U.S. policy toward China.; The conceptual framework of this study is "post-revisionist," emphasizing the discrepancy between Dulles's anti-communist rhetoric and his actual policy orientation, while taking into consideration the domestic and international environment within which Dulles operated his foreign policies. It focuses on the China dilemma that Dulles faced regarding especially the Sino-American conflict in Indochina (1953-1954), the first Taiwan Straits crisis (1954-1955), and its "sequel"--the second Taiwan Straits crisis over the offshore islands (1958). Based on primary sources in both English and Chinese, it concludes that, contrary to the traditional view that Dulles was a rigid moralist, eager to practice "brinkmanship" in dealing with international communism, he was often quite cautious in his policy proposals. With the costly experience of the Korean War in mind, Dulles did not want to see the United States embroiled in another armed conflict with China in Asia. Despite his strident rhetoric about "massive retaliation" and "liberation," Dulles in fact pursued a policy of restraint toward China. During the crises at Dienbienphu and the Taiwan Straits, his course of action was moderate and tempered. The sharp contrasts between his tough public talk and his cautious policies highlighted the dualistic nature of Dulles's diplomacy. |
