| Many argue that democratic authority is a unique form of political authority. They argue that democracy possesses a special claim to political legitimacy. They claim that the relationship shared between the rulers and the ruled in a democracy is peculiar and cannot be adequately captured by our traditional accounts of political authority. In particular, Joseph Raz's service conception of authority is said to be ill-equipped to account for democratic authority's distinctness. In its place, we require a new account of political authority, capable of capturing democracy's specific features.;In response to these claims, I argue that 1) democratic authority is not unique, 2) political legitimacy is not sufficient for establishing political authority or generating political obligation, 3) Raz's service conception of authority provides a necessary component that any account of political authority must supply, and 4) many democratic theorists trade on the advantages of the service conception while maintaining its irrelevance.;Democracies, then, possess a unique claim to political obligation insofar as the decision process or output (or both) are necessary for securing our moral rights and fulfilling our moral duties. Reorganizing the literature in this way helps to demonstrate the success conditions for any viable theory of democratic authority. In all cases, the crucial step is demonstrating why democracy (and democracy alone) shares a special relationship with moral obligation. In the end, democratic authority is unique to the extent that democracy possesses some special ability to respect individuals' inherent equality or dignity, realize justice, or whatever other obligations represent fundamental moral demands. |
