Outsourcing Companies Contract With Third-party Logistics Arrangements

From the analysis of Game Theory, The first Game Nash Equilibrium between an enterprise and a third party logistics is that the enterprise chooses not outsouring and the third party logistics chooses not effort. So the two fail in teamwork and welfare lapse.The reason is that morality risk between an enterprise and a third party logistics. When the two sign on contract, information is symmetric, after the two sign on contract, the third party logistics chooses action(effort or not effort ), "nature" chooses 'habitus', the action of the third party logistics and nature decide some visible results. But the outsouring enterprise can only observe the result, and can not observe the action of the third party logistics and nature itself.The article sees the teamwork between the outsouring enterprise and the third party logistics as principal-agent problem, and discusses how the outsouring enterprise draw up a contract, makes the third party logistics choose the best action for the outsouring enterprise under the premise of satisfying their own IR and IC.The article raises and analyzes the single index contract model on the basis of Mirrlees and Holmstorm's 'parameter method of distribution function'. And also raises multi-index contract model and conclude the best incentive contract. The last part of the article analyze that the model result apply in specific outsouring enterprise and third party logistics.