Intergovernmental Game, Government Performance Evaluation And Fluctuations In Coal Mine Safety Regulations

China’s coal mine safety regulations has reached a milestones set by "The 12th five-year plan of coal mine safety production" by the end of 2014.The number of closed small coal mines in China has reached 1509 with 106 million tons backward, high-risk coal capacity reduction due to the central government’s closure policy. And the number of coal mine accidents and deaths are reducing by 16.3% and 14.3%. Meanwhile, the State Council explicitly require the provinces continue to promote the duty of closed small coal mines, so that the number of mines shut down is not less than 2000 by the end of 2015.Therefore, "small coal mines theory" proposed by academia on mine safety issues has become the past. And China’s coal industry has consisted of a group of large state-owned coal enterprise groups. However, the state-owned coal mining group didn’t solve the long-standing safety problem, but has become the hardest hit regarding mine accidents. According to the State Coal Mine Safety Supervision statistical bulletin, the accidents of state-owned coal enterprise groups accounts for 61% of the 14 major coal mine accidents happened in 2014, and mostly it is nominally occurred in "four card" safety standards state-owned coal enterprises. As a result, improving the coal industry concentration did not reduce the risk of coal mining operations, but will make the risk of coal-mining showing the trend of centralization. So, we must ask what the direct cause of the problem to mine safety is. In response to the problem, scholars in the field of coal mine safety regulations Xiao XingZhi put forward "regulation fluctuations" proposition in 2011, as an explanation of its reasons for repeated coal mine accidents. Other scholars also follow this basis and continue to use the data examined for the existence of this form of regulation. However, what is behind the fluctuations of coal mine safety regulations are? Do fluctuations in its regulations have different specific morphological? Academia does not give a clear answer to these questions, or just slightly mention as a exogenous variables. This paper based on regulation fluctuations, use endogenous government cadre performance evaluation as a starting point, with the vertical game model between the central and regional governments, to the analyze specific transmission mechanism between optimal performance and regulation fluctuations of coal mine safety regulations.The main contents and conclusions of this paper is divided into three parts. First, we make use of the lengthways game model between the local government and the central government to deduce the optimal government performance evaluation system "light security, heavy growth", when the central and local government chooses their best choice in the model. Then we will use the endogenous evaluation system to explain the coal mine safety regulation fluctuations problem that goes through three phases and in two specific forms due to the mine Forced mechanism and the specific preventive mechanism. Second, we will use two indicators of the evaluation system to build regression models. After that, we will adopt the threshold regression method to analyze our country’s 26 provinces panel data from 2001 to 2013. Then, the threshold regression results show that the relationship of the two indicators has a turning point that is 2007, and the influence of regulation fluctuations on the security level under the complementary relationship is three times of the substitute’s condition. Last, we will put forward some beneficial and feasible policy suggestions in terms of the government cadre performance evaluation and the safety regulation system due to the above theoretical and empirical research works.Compared with previous studies, this paper’s possible innovation lies in the following two aspects.(1) We creatively put the endogenous government performance evaluation into the discussion on coal mine safety regulations fluctuations from Vertical game perspective between the central and local. Specifically, first, we simplify the central’s performance evaluation system to only include the level of coal production and coal mine safety tasks by means of multi-task principal-agent model. And we analyze how the two levels of government to select the optimal mode from output efficiency and signal efficiency indicators in performance evaluation game model, when the two indicators of performance evaluation function are in alternative and complementary relationship. Second, we use prevention mechanism and mine forced mechanism to give a clear explanation to the region’s coal mine safety regulation fluctuations and its two forms of wave. In short, we highlight assessment indicators’ alternative and complementary relationship lead to the two forms regulation fluctuations by two transmission mechanisms from performance evaluation starting point, which expand and refine the coal regulations fluctuations.(2) We set the year variable as the threshold variable that is the turning point between the two indicators’alternative and complementary relationship by means of panel threshold regression created by Hansen. And we also measure the specific impact of two different forms of regulation fluctuations on the safety level.