A Study On Anti-monopoly Enforcement Based On Typical Cases Inductive Since The AML Implementation

AML has been executed for six years since August1,2008. It shows preliminary good results, but law enforcement troubles make most people feel not satisfied enough. How the current’s Chinese AML is executed on earth? What problems exist on the law enforcement? Why these problems exist? How will we do better in the future? This paper will study these questions which are worth thinking about.This paper focuses on holistic analysis in law enforcement since Chinese antitrust law is executed. We discover several problems in enforcement through summarizing the cases. Further more, we analyze the reasons of these problems by public choice theory, asymmetric information theory as well as principal-agent theory. As a result, we believe that the self-interest of law enforcement agencies, the problem of the asymmetric information and the principal-agent in the AML enforcement is the main cause of low efficiency of antitrust enforcement. Beside, this research use the model to simulate the game, then put forward to improve enforcement mechanisms relevant policy recommendations.This research is divided into six parts:The first chapter is an introduction, which consists of describing the background, briefly reviewing relevant literatures, as well as proposing significance, content, research methods, framework, innovation and inadequate. This study indicates that previous studies focused on the single anti-monopoly case and lacked holistic and theoretical analysis on anti-monopoly cases since antitrust law is executed.The second chapter is the problems in Chinese anti-monopoly enforcement based on cases summarized since the AML implementation. Through relevant case studies, the problems in anti-monopoly enforcement are summarized into these points:(1) The administrative monopoly is prominent;(2) Differentiated enforcement attitude of enforcement agencies;(3) Dislocation enforcement of enforcement agencies and the inaction with anti-monopoly committee;(4) The query to the economics method suitability;(5) lack of private enforcement. The efficiency of anti-monopoly enforcement is be impacted by these problems during anti-monopoly implementation.The third chapter is theoretical analysis of anti-monopoly enforcement. The reasons why problems often happen during anti-monopoly implementation are analyzed on two points. The first is the behavioral choices of the executive body in public choice theory. The second is principal-agent problems induced by asymmetric information. This study discovery the individual rational behavior of implementation people will result in undesirable law enforcement because of the limitation of the difference between law enforcement agencies transverse and longitudinal selfishness. Moreover, asymmetric information and principal-agent during anti-monopoly law enforcement lead to lots of adverse selection and moral risk problems, which also cause undesirable law enforcement on anti-monopoly. Based on the analysis, we propose two optimal paths to effective implement antitrust law:scientifically set anti-monopoly enforcement agencies and improve the incentive oversight mechanisms.The fourth chapter is the gaming simulation of interest group in anti-monopoly enforcement. Transverse interests among law enforcement agencies as well as the vertical interests’difference among companies, consumer and law enforcement agencies are analyzed and play game simulated by play game theory.The fifth chapter is policy recommendations. We provide five recommendations to promote effectively enforcement of the AML according the foregoing.(1) Cultivating the idea of anti-monopoly enforcement;(2) Establish an effective supervision mechanism;(3) Strengthen the independence, professional and authority of enforcement agencies;(4) Improving the relevant supporting measures of the AML;(5) Optimize the coordinate and connect between public enforcement and private enforcementThe sixth chapter is conclusions. Summarize the contents of the foregoing.