Research On Incentive Of Supplier Product Quality Considering Social Preference

In the operation of manufacturing enterprises,the quality of products is mainly determined by the quality of parts supplied by upstream suppliers.Although manufacturers have taken a series of measures to encourage suppliers' product quality,the effect is not obvious,and quality incidents caused by supplier's product quality problems are not uncommon.This has caused huge economic and reputational losses to the manufacturer.And suppliers are individuals with different social preferences and they are heterogeneity and bounded rationality.Therefore,it makes sense to study manufacturer's effective incentive mechanism to improve the product quality of suppliers with social preference.This study focuses on the product quality incentive problem of a group of suppliers with social preference.Firstly,a "one-to-many" two-stage supply chain structure with single manufacturer as the core and multi-supplier is constructed.Secondly,the mechanism of reward and punishment based on the quality level of supplier product is designed.Then,three scenarios are designed to analyze the incentive of supplier product quality with fairness preference and competitive preference: Incentive without considering fairness preference(competitive preference).Compared with incentive considering fairness preference(competitive preference),and the influence of fairness preference's "jealousy" and "guilt" intensity(competitive preference's “greed” and “jealousy” intensity)on incentive effect;Finally,application of Product quality incentive in Group D Automobile suppliers is analyzed.,And the product quality incentive of the supplier with social preference is verified and analyzed by investigating the social preference of component suppliers.The study draws the following conclusions:(1)Whether suppliers have social preferences or not,manufacturers can effectively improve the quality of their products by establishing reasonable incentives and penalties,and can achieve a "win-win" between the manufacturer and the supplier group in terms of profit.The average profit of the manufacturer and the average profit of the supplier are positively correlated with the average quality level of the supplier's product,and the total demand of the manufacturer is negatively correlated with the average quality level of the supplier's product.And the reward and punishment mechanism based on product quality can effectively improve the product quality level of suppliers with social preference.(2)When suppliers have fairness preferences,where manufacturers do not implement incentives and penalties,the quality level of parts provided by suppliers is generally lower than that without fairness preference;when manufacturers implement reward and punishment mechanism based on product quality level,The quality level of components supplied by suppliers is better than that without considering fairness preference.And the greater the intensity of "jealousy" and "guilt" in fairness preference,the greater the effect of quality incentive.(3)When suppliers have competitive preference,the quality level of parts provided by the supplier is gradually approaching the situation without competitive preference under different rewards and punishments,and the higher the average quality level is,the higher the average profit of supplier is.The higher the manufacturer's profits,too.Moreover,the greater the intensity of "greed" and "jealousy" in competitive preference,the greater the effect of quality incentive.(4)Through questionnaire investigation,it is found that the components suppliers of Group D Automobile Co.,Ltd.generally have social preference.Using the reward and punishment mechanism based on product quality and setting appropriate rewards and punishments can effectively improve the product quality of suppliers.