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Research On Optimized Income Distribution Of General Contracting Complex Considering Subject's Fair Concern

Posted on:2020-12-03Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:M ZhangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2392330620458033Subject:Engineering economics and management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In 2016,the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development clearly stated in the document “Several Opinions on Further Promoting the Development of General Contracting of Projects” that “deepening the reform of the organization and implementation of construction projects and promoting the general contracting system”.At present,some construction engineering enterprises in China only have a single design or construction capability.In order to complete the general contracting task of the project,one enterprise with a single capability alone acts as the general contractor of the project,and then subcontracts the parts that cannot be completed.Other enterprises;the other is to form a joint project by the participating units of the project to complete the project general contracting project.At present,the formation of bidding consortiums in construction projects has become a trend,especially in some large investment projects.The main purpose of forming a general contracting project consortium is to reduce engineering construction costs,share project risks,realize resource sharing and complementarity among various enterprises,and complete project construction tasks to achieve total risk.Work together,win-win cooperation,and achieve maximum project benefits.Since each member company that constitutes a consortium belongs to an independent economy and maximizes its own interests as a cooperative goal,there is a problem of fair and reasonable income distribution.When the project income cannot be reasonable and fair among the members of the consortium.When it is distributed,it will lead to a decrease in the motivation and enthusiasm of the cooperation of the members of the consortium,which will affect the overall benefits of the project and may even lead to cooperation failure.Therefore,a reasonable and fair income distribution strategy is the key to whether the members of the consortium can cooperate smoothly.From the perspective of behavioral science,this paper introduces a negotiation model in the optimization of income distribution of design and construction consortium based on the principle of revenue sharing and fairness concern,and constructs a negotiation model of optimized income distribution.At frist,according to the status of the consortium negotiating body,the negotiation model is established under the conditions of complete information and incomplete information.Under the condition of complete information,it is divided into three scenarios.The construction party,the bargaining negotiation income distribution model on the income distribution coefficient.Finally,the case parameters are used to conduct the bargaining simulation experiment,and the impact of the negotiation party's fair concern behavior on the negotiation cycle,the income distribution coefficient,the consortium optimization income and the respective optimization income of the consortium members are analyzed in detail.Through analysis,the following research results are obtained: When designing a fair concern behavior,the fair concern behavior in the negotiation process will strive for more benefits for itself,and also increase the total income of the consortium,indicating that the design party is fair to concern behavior promotion joint The overall income of the body increases;only when the construction party has a fair concern behavior,its fair concern behavior will strive for more benefits for itself,but at the same time it will reduce the total income of the consortium,indicating that the construction party's fair concern is not conducive to the consortium.The increase in overall income;when both parties have fair concerns,the construction party's income increases,the design side and the consortium's income decrease;the concern for fairness will increase the negotiation cycle,and may even lead to negotiation failure,which is not conducive to optimization.The increase in revenue;when the designer uses its strong position to deter the construction party from making a profit transfer,the design party's revenue increases,but the total revenue of the construction party and the system decreases.
Keywords/Search Tags:General contracting consortium, optimizing income distribution, bargai ning game, fairness concern, negotiation model
PDF Full Text Request
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