Research On The Arrangement Of Responsibility And Right Of People's Livelihood Infrastructure Under PPP Project

The people's livelihood Infrastructure Construction Project is a requirement for the development of infrastructure construction under the precondition of adapting to the economic restructuring and industrial transformation and upgrading after China's economy has entered the “new normal” stage.The combination of public welfare and profitability of the people's livelihood infrastructure construction project makes it suitable for adopting the PPP model to finance and construct.Through the introduction of social capital,the efficiency of the project can be improved on the basis of decentralizing risks to achieve the ultimate purpose of the PPP financing model.The characteristics of the PPP model that distinguish it from the previous one are mainly manifested in three aspects: partnership,benefit sharing,and risk sharing.Under this feature,it can be relatively effective that the process of the government and social capital cooperate to provide people's livelihood infrastructure and these public goods and services.However,at present,there are many problems in the operation of PPP projects in China,which highlight in the selection of programs for the sharing of responsibilities and the allocation of control rights.The government department will conflict with the private sector's decision-making goals from it's double optimal point of view of their own benefits and social benefits.Adding the factor of incomplete contracts,the party occupying the dominant position of negotiation may have some opportunistic behaviors,and the other party will adopt corresponding countermeasures in consideration of this factor,which will cause problems such as inefficiency in PPP projects.Therefore,optimizing the allocation of project responsibilities and control rights can effectively reduce the probability of the occurrence of opportunistic behavior between the two partners,and then smoothly achieve the financing and construction process of PPP projects.This article introduces the contract theory,GHM theory and BG theory in the context of the people's livelihood infrastructure under PPP project construction.It shows that the rational allocation of the responsibility and control plan of the PPP project can effectively incentivize the cooperative parties and improve the cooperation efficiency.The importance of investment and the degree of effort of both parties,the value evaluation of the project,and the relative status in the negotiation process will directly affect the allocation of responsibilities and rights of PPP projects.Based on these theories and assumptions,this paper establishes a corresponding bargaining model,and describes the game process of negotiation between government and the private sector under the conditions of complete information and incomplete information,and then optimizes the level of responsibility of both partners.Under the premise of relevant hypotheses,the article also constructs the utility function of the government and the private sector.According to the initial configuration,the joint investment,and the remaining negotiated distribution of the cooperation,the corresponding optimal control right configuration size can be determined.Finally,reviewing the conclusions of this article,then the corresponding policy recommendations are given from the three perspectives of macro-policy,laws,and project specifications.