| U.S.-Russian relations are at their lowest point since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. Although suspicion and distrust from the age of the Cold War has undoubtedly plagued U.S.-Russian relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the recent list of conflicts of interest between the two countries, including Iran's nuclear program, the ever-expanding NATO alliance, the planned deployment of the missile defense system in both the Czech Republic and Poland, U.S. acceptance of an independent Kosovo, and U.S. involvement in the conflict in Georgia has taken relations to a dangerously familiar situation where arms control issues are major points of contention on the agendas of both the Russian Federation and the United States. All these conflicts of interest have genuinely disturbed the Russians causing them to respond in a reactive manner and question the motives of the United States both in the region and around the world. This thesis argues that a new Cold War between Russia and the United States is possible (if matters cannot be dealt with diplomatically and actions by one side are misperceived by the other side), based on and supported by, the Stimulus Response Theory. This thesis argues that an ideological conflict between capitalism and communism does not have to exist in order for a new (and different) Cold War to take place. A case study will be conducted on U.S.-Russian relations by discussing the conflicts that preceded the Cold War and then explaining the recent conflicts and the issues where the U.S. and Russia seem to be at odds. Throughout the four chapters, Iran and its contentious nuclear program, the expansion of NATO and the missile defense system, an independent Kosovo, as well as the most recent conflict in Georgia will be discussed and analyzed from both the Russian and American perspectives. In conclusion, the argument will be posed that the way to avoid a new arms race would be to solve these differences diplomatically, paying close attention to the reactions of both the U.S. and Russia so as not to misperceive and or miscalculate one country's response. |
