Maoist dualism and Chinese communist foreign relations, 1935-1949

This work examines the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s foreign relations with the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the Party's foreign policy structure, in the time period 1935-1950. The basic thesis of this dissertation is that the Maoist dualism combining the "class-struggle paradigm" and the united front doctrine emerged as a pattern in the CCP's policy thinking and behaviour. Therefore, the CCP was capable of being realistic and flexible in meeting its short-term goals, while firmly maintaining its long-term revolutionary anti-imperialist commitment, which was ultimately in opposition to U.S. interests in the Far East. This explains, from a Chinese perspective, why the 1940s witnessed much wheeling and dealing between the CCP and the U.S., but a deadly impasse in Sino-American relations was finally reached when the two sides engaged in a "shooting war" in Korea. It was not inflexibility on the part of the CCP, but the fundamental incompatibility between the CCP's anti-American-imperialism and the U.S.'s anti-Chinese-communism that doomed an amicable Sino-American working relationship from the very beginning.Essentially based on newly-released CCP inner-party documents in conjunction with the conventional materials, this work demonstrates the discrepancy between the CCP's policy formulation and policy implementation. Behind seemingly flexible policy execution was the Party's specific policy objectives, which the CCP kept strictly to themselves. It was these hidden purposes and the strategy designed for achieving the desired goals that reflected the Party's long-term commitment and unwavering radical revolutionary direction, which determined its anti-American-imperialism. The CCP's revolutionary diplomacy had its own rationale, which cannot be explained in the norm of western diplomatic conventions.As the other side of the coin, this work also reviews the relations between the CCP and the Soviet Union in the period under consideration. In contrast to conventional wisdom, it finds that the CCP-Moscow relations were those of intimate comrades. The CCP leadership under Mao kept frequent radio contact with Moscow after 1936, and Mao was very responsive to Moscow's advice. So much so that Stalin actually played a significant role in the CCP's policy making process, although the Chinese enjoyed a great deal of autonomy as far as the making of the concrete policy and strategy was concerned. Due to the CCP's "class-struggle paradigm", it was the Party's unquestioned conviction that the CCP-USSR and the Guomindang (GMD)-US were natural alignments. This perception of domestic-international division of forces constituted a realistic basis for the CCP's "proletarian internationalism".