Research On County-level Government Behavior In The Reform Of "Province Directly Managing Counties"

Since the founding of New China,the central government has carried out a series of reforms to adjust the relationship between the central and local governments,and the government’s management capabilities and governance levels have gradually improved.The report of the 19 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China pointed out that socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era.The main contradiction in our country has become the contradiction between the people’s growing needs for a better life and unbalanced and inadequate development.This contradiction indicates the new era.Higher requirements are put forward for the government’s public service level,especially the public service capacity of the county-level government at the grassroots level.The behavior of the county-level government directly affects the trust of the grassroots people in the country and the government.However,as the reform of the administrative system continues to deepen,the unreasonable distribution of financial power and power has caused the county-level government to be in a helpless situation: it cannot meet the needs of the grassroots people,and cannot get rid of its dependence on the higher-level government.This situation makes the county become our country.Weaknesses in the development pattern.Therefore,the reform of "provincial direct management of counties" is an important way to deepen the allocation of power and enhance the capacity of county-level governments.It is an important reform aimed at empowering county-level governments.It is important for the rational distribution of power between governments and promoting county-level economic development.Has a very important meaning.In recent years,under the leadership of the central government,various localities have carried out the "provincial direct management of counties" reform to varying degrees,gradually delegating certain financial,administrative,and economic management powers,giving county-level governments greater autonomy,but In this process,the reform of "provincial direct management of counties" with different power allocations makes county-level government behaviors show different preferences.How the reform makes county-level government behaviors and the reasons for them are the questions to be explored in this article.This paper focuses on the reform of "provincial direct management of counties" as the main research content,and focuses on county-level government behaviors in the process of "provincial direct management of counties" reforms,and identifies the impact of reforms on county-level government behaviors in the context of empirical analysis.Existing studies pay more attention to the policy effects of the “provincial direct management of counties” reform.Most of them analyze the changes in the county economy before and after the reform.There are few horizontal comparisons of the impact of different “provincial direct management of counties” reforms on county-level government behavior.An empirical analysis of its power distribution effect.Therefore,this article analyzes the impact of reforms on county-level government behaviors in different regions from the perspective of power allocation,and proposes and verifies that the reform of “provincial direct management of counties” with different power allocation structures will reform the economic foundation and development of counties due to the experimental reforms.Differences in the effects of reforms appear due to different goals.In order to examine how the reform of "provincial direct management of counties" with different power allocations affects county-level government behaviors,this paper constructs a theoretical model.The main body of the model is the reformed countylevel government,using "provincial direct management of counties" to reform the county-level government.Regional differences in government expenditure on public goods,fiscal revenue distribution,and administrative costs identify the impact of reforms.This paper finds that reform will promote the expenditure of public goods in economically weak counties,but has no obvious impact on economically strong counties,and that reform will increase the demand for social management in economically strong counties and improve the administrative efficiency of economically strong counties.In addition,this article examines the impact of the“provincial direct management of counties” reforms with different power allocations on the fiscal capacity of county-level governments.The county-level fiscal capacity reflects the adequacy of county-level finances,and the county-level fiscal potential reflects the county-level fiscal capacity.The policy transformation ability of the government.The results show that under these two indicators,the impact of reforms on the behavior of county-level governments with different economic bases is strong and weak.Reforms have little impact on the financial capacity of economically strong counties,but have obvious effects on the financial capacity of economically strong counties.This is due to the fact that economically weak counties have more powers after the reform,and the expansion of power has brought about an increase in expenditure responsibilities.County-level governments rely more on fiscal transfer payments,while economically strong counties have more financial resources.Transfer payments are less dependent,so the reform has strengthened the ability of county-level governments to provide public resources,and the empirical results also complement the above conclusions.The reform has a significant role in promoting the fiscal allocation capacity of economically strong counties and economically weak counties.This shows that the decentralized power of the reform of "provincial direct management of counties" with different power allocations has strengthened the expenditure responsibilities of county-level governments,but increased the power and authority of the county government.Expenditure responsibility has increased the financial pressure on economically weak counties,and it is difficult to achieve assistance to economically weak counties.To sum up,this article through the in-depth study of the power mechanism of the "provincial direct management of the county" reform with different power allocation structures,taking Zhejiang Province,Anhui Province,Hainan Province and Fujian Province as examples,reveals the different power allocation structures The specific effect of the “provincial direct management of counties” reform on county-level government behaviors,expounds the reasons for the differences in county-level government behaviors,enriches the relevant theoretical research on the “provincial direct management of counties” reforms,and puts forward relevant suggestions for further deepening the reform.