Research On The Behavior Mechanism Of Local Government With Implementation Deviation Of Planning Construction Land Quota From The Perspective Of Rational Man

In China,the strategic behavior of local government in land supply has resulted in massive urban over-expansion.Local government are supposed to regulate the land market,but in the context of Chinese land property rights and market,financial,and official performance evaluation and promotion systems,local government have themselves become a key subject in the land market and reap huge benefits from urban land development.With this incentive,instead of taking appropriate measures to correct land market failures,local government have further promoted inefficient urban expansion based on the land use,intervention,and distortion of land markets,while bringing about numerous socioeconomic and environmental sustainability problems.For this reason,the central government has compiled top-down land use plan quota in order to play the leading and controlling role of planning in land resource allocation,limit the scale of urban land development by local government that conflicts with the plan,thus curbing urban sprawl.Local government,as the most critical implementers of planning land quota allocation and implementation,often ignore plan implementation under the stimulation of local development interests,resulting in construction land quota failing to effectively control local urban sprawl.The actual scale of land development in some areas significantly exceeds the plan quota.The inconsistency between the actual scale of urban land development and utilization greatly reduces the effectiveness of planning in regulating land resource allocation and governing urban sprawl.Therefore,this study constructs a theoretical analysis framework based on the rational man perspective,and conducts an in-depth analysis and discussion on the behavior mechanism of local government in the implementation deviation of planning construction land quota in centralized land use management.On this basis,the constraint quota of urban and rural construction land scale is chosen to measure and explain the implementation deviation;using the relevant statistical data of 260prefecture-level and above cities in China from 2010 to 2015,the spatial Durbin model with space-time dual fixation is applied to empirically test the influence extent of local government behavior on the implementation deviation of plan urban and rural construction land quota,and relevant policy recommendations are put forward accordingly.The main research findings are as follows:(1)Theoretically,based on the competitive relationship between local government and central government,local government at the same level,former and subsequent local government officials,this paper constructs an analysis framework of local government behavior mechanism to explain the implementation deviation of planning urban and rural construction land quota from the aspects of finance,performance evaluation and promotion system,and the spatial spillover effect and individual characteristics of officials,,and finds that the implementation deviation of planning construction land quota is a rational choice of rational man in local government.(2)From the implementation of planning quota,the deviation of planning urban and rural construction land quota is serious.During the sample study period,the deviation degree of the plan construction land quota was about 1.37-1.94,and the overall spatial and temporal heterogeneity is obvious,with different trends at different stages in various regions.According to the spatial correlation of the implementation of planning quota,there is a significant positive global spatial correlation and a local spatial characteristic of "small agglomeration,large dispersion" in the implementation deviation of planning urban and rural construction land quota.(3)The competition behavior of rational man in local government significantly intensifies the implementation deviation behavior of planning land use quota.The empirical study found that the hypotheses proposed in the theoretical analysis framework constructed in this paper were all verified.The results of the empirical tests show that:(1)the higher the dependence on land finance,the more likely local government will violate the planning targets in order to obtain land finance.The learning and imitation behavior of land supply and land use quota among local government will lead neighboring local government to break through the indicators and promote large-scale urban land development.Therefore,this behavior of local government will not only cause deviation in the implementation of local plan construction land quota,but also aggravate the degree of deviation in the implementation of neighboring areas.(2)The greater the competitiveness of investment attraction,the more likely local government will control the land market and distort land prices to cause urban over-expansion and break through the plan quota.Local government will adopt the means of "bottom-up competition" in attracting investment,thus generating positive spatial spillover effects.Therefore,this behavior of local government will not only cause deviation in the implementation of local plan construction land quota,but also aggravate the deviation in neighboring areas.(3)The stronger the competition among local government,that is,the closer the economic scale of local government within the same provincial government,the fiercer the competition among them,and the more local government tend to break the plan quota to promote large-scale urban land development.As a result,the more serious the deviation from the implementation of the plan construction land quota.(4)In terms of the personal characteristics of officials,newly appointed officials are eager to make achievements,which will generate a large number of land development needs in the short term.In addition,officials promoted from other cities are more motivated to win economic development and urban construction effectiveness by changing the land planning layout than officials promoted from the local city,and thus are more likely to make or promote large-scale investment and construction.Therefore,the more serious the deviation from the implementation of the plan construction land quota.(4)Based on the theoretical analysis and empirical test results,the corresponding policy suggestions are put forward from the short-term and long-term perspectives respectively.Including scientific and reasonable planning quota,improving the dynamic supervision and management of planning quota,deepening the reform of financial and tax system,adjusting the performance appraisal mechanism,and formulating diversified and differentiated land policies to weaken the irrational competition behavior of local government in promoting urban expansion.It is conducive to ensuring the effective implementation of land use plan quota and controlling the inefficient and disorderly expansion of urban scale.