Research Of Incentive Mechanism For Local University Science And Technology Innovation Team In China

Many local universities in China have constructed innovation teams in order to adjust themselves to the needs of development. Innovation teams of local universities play an important role in enhancing their own innovative capacities in science and technology and serving the regional economy. Besides, they are of great importance in cultivating creative talents and building an innovative country. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the research on incentive mechanism.This paper aims to gain a better understanding of innovation teams of local universities with the aid of the model of the processing of managing enterprise team. Team model, which can prompt the diversity of work team, improve work efficiency as well as help enterprises to adjust themselves to reacting flexibly to the changing environment, has been popularized in many enterprises. This paper carries out research by making use of the relevance between the innovation teams of local universities and those of enterprises.By sorting out relevant theories and analyzing innovation teams of local universities and the features of their incentive mechanisms based on questionnaires, the paper focuses on the material incentives and non-material incentives of those local universities for innovation teams and discusses the convocations, necessities and some problems about the implementation of the two kinds of incentive mechanisms. At the same time, it also points out difficulties in managing innovations teams of science and technology and constructs restraint mechanism for innovation teams of local universities.The paper analyses three environmental elements, that is, systematic environment, market environment and cultural environment, on the research basis of the connotations, features and effects of innovation teams of local universities and points out the operational model, structural categories and organizational model of innovation teams of local universities. Moreover, it gives a systematic analysis of the types of innovation teams of local universities and their according characters and the present situation of those incentive mechanisms and the existing problems of innovation teams of local universities.It discusses the fundamental conditions, channels and laws in constructing innovation teams of local universities and puts forward the basis, principles and elements in management and a cooperative managing mechanism as well. In addition, the paper probes into the incentives used by team leaders for its team members and the balance of the talents of the team members. It also proposes a comprehensive incentive model for the incentive mechanism of innovation teams of local universities.The paper gives a relative analysis to the three features, namely cooperation, post management and psychological rapport, of science and technology innovation teams of local universities and analyzes the incentive models constructed based on the mentioned characters separately. After combing the organizational plans of incentive mechanisms for science and technology innovation teams of local universities with the principles and the process of their implementation as well as the control, feedback and improvement of those mechanisms, the paper points out the problems in optimal organization of these incentive mechanisms and advances some strategies in the optimization of incentive mechanisms of innovation teams according to the characteristics of different demands.Through the above efforts, we get the following conclusions.Compared with general team members, those of innovation teams of local universities have better cognitive and reasoning abilities and they also have relatively better understanding and more control of uncertain elements, which is thus helpful in avoiding risk. However, if team members show little capability in risk aversion, risk preference will became more flexible. As a result, team members will have to face more risk and the management risk for the innovation team will increase accordingly.There is an inverse relationship between the mandate risk of the incentive mechanism for the team members and the degree of control. The more directly the team leaders supervise the team members, the more control they will gain and the lower will be the occurrence rate of mandate risk. On the other hand, the more the layers through which the team leaders have an indirect supervision on its members, the less control power they will get and the higher will be the occurrence rate of mandate risk.Whether the different needs of the team leaders and its members are satisfied depends on both the size of needs and the level of the incentive mechanism. If those needs are met on a full scale, the morale of the whole team will exercise to a large extent. Otherwise, it is kind of wasting resources.No matter it is the team leader or its members, their efforts contributing to work can not be simply determined by an incentive element? The morale of the whole team will be aroused only after the various needs of its members have been satisfied instead of the needs of single individual. However, it is not a simple add-up of different needs but a comprehensive functional relationship.